European Law on Capital Markets – Quo Vadis? by Huemer, Daniela
Cornell Law Library
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate
Student Conference Papers Conferences, Lectures, and Workshops
4-16-2005
European Law on Capital Markets – Quo Vadis?
Daniela Huemer
Harvard Law School, daniela.huemer@jku.at
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_clacp
Part of the Banking and Finance Commons, and the Corporation and Enterprise Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences, Lectures, and Workshops at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers by an authorized
administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Huemer, Daniela, "European Law on Capital Markets – Quo Vadis?" (2005). Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student
Conference Papers. Paper 5.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_clacp/5




I.  The American Response to Corporate Misconduct – The Sarbanes- Oxley Act........................................ 6
A. Spirit and purpose............................................................................................................................... 7
B. Most significant provisions................................................................................................................. 7
1. Accounting Oversight Board.......................................................................................................... 7
2. Auditor Independence.................................................................................................................... 8
3. Corporate Responsibility and enhances financial disclosure.......................................................... 8
4. Analyst of Conflict of Interests ...................................................................................................... 9
5. Penalties......................................................................................................................................... 9
II. The European Response to Corporate Misconduct.................................................................................. 10
A. The European Capital Market and its Development ......................................................................... 11
1. A Single Currency: The Euro....................................................................................................... 11
2. Framework for Financial Markets................................................................................................ 11
3. Lisbon European Council............................................................................................................. 12
4. Lamfalussy Process...................................................................................................................... 12
5. High Level Group of Company Law Experts............................................................................... 13
B. Directives in the field of capital market............................................................................................ 15
C. The Market Abuse Directive (2003/6/EC)........................................................................................ 17
1. Spirit and purpose of the Market Abuse Directive ....................................................................... 19
2. Insider dealing ............................................................................................................................. 19
a. Inside-information ................................................................................................................... 20
b. Insiders. ................................................................................................................................... 20
c. Legal consequences ................................................................................................................. 21
d. Special provision for a legal person being the insider ............................................................. 21
e. Disclosure duties ..................................................................................................................... 21
3. Market manipulation.................................................................................................................... 22
a. ‘market manipulation’ ............................................................................................................. 22
b. Legal consequence .................................................................................................................. 23
4. Supervisory body ......................................................................................................................... 23
5. Further European enforcing provisions........................................................................................ 24
D. The Prospectus Directive (2003/71/EC)........................................................................................... 26
1. Spirit and purpose of the Prospectus Directive ............................................................................ 27
2. Obligation to publish a prospectus ............................................................................................... 28
a. offers of securities to the public............................................................................................... 28
b. Admission of securities to trading on a regulated market........................................................ 29
3. Form and content of the prospectus ............................................................................................. 29
a. Form ........................................................................................................................................ 30
b. Content .................................................................................................................................... 31
4. Time for publication .................................................................................................................... 32
5. Further European enforcing provisions........................................................................................ 32
E. Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC) ............................................................................................ 33
1. Spirit and Purpose of the Directive .............................................................................................. 36
2. Scope of application..................................................................................................................... 36
3. Periodic information .................................................................................................................... 37
a. Annual financial reports .......................................................................................................... 37
b. Half-yearly financial reports.................................................................................................... 39
c. Interim management standards ................................................................................................ 39
d. Responsibility and liability...................................................................................................... 40
4. Ongoing information.................................................................................................................... 40
a. Information about major holdings ........................................................................................... 40
European Law on Capital Markets – quo vadis?2
b. Information for holders of securities admitted to trading on a regulated market ..................... 41
5. General obligations ...................................................................................................................... 42
a. Control by the home Member State ......................................................................................... 42
b. Language provision ................................................................................................................. 42
c. Third countries ........................................................................................................................ 43
d. Penalties .................................................................................................................................. 43
6. Further European enforcing provisions........................................................................................ 43
III. The European Union: quo vadis?........................................................................................................... 45
IV. A Critique on the Present Trend(s) ........................................................................................................ 46
A. Is EU-wide activity necessary? The two sides of the argument:....................................................... 47
1. National activity is preferable ...................................................................................................... 47
2. Working on an EU-wide harmonization is preferable.................................................................. 47
a. Fewer burdens ......................................................................................................................... 47
b. Fewer costs.............................................................................................................................. 48
c. Globalization ........................................................................................................................... 48
B. Which degree of activity is preferable? ............................................................................................ 49
1. High degree of activity................................................................................................................. 49
a. More provisions – more information ....................................................................................... 49
b. More provisions – more reliable information .......................................................................... 49
c. More provisions – less cheating............................................................................................... 50
2. Low degree of activity ................................................................................................................. 51
a. Providing less “bad news” ....................................................................................................... 51
b. Too short a timeframe for such big modifications. .................................................................. 52
c. Compromise at a cost of smoothness....................................................................................... 53
d. Confidence takes time. ............................................................................................................ 54
e. Protection is not cost free. ....................................................................................................... 54
f. Scandal can never be completely eliminated............................................................................ 54
V. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 55
European Law on Capital Markets – Quo Vadis?
Daniela Huemer
INTRODUCTION
The occurrence of more than a dozen accounting scandals in the United States
over the past few years in the United States have deeply shaken the capital market and 
have led some to believe that “corporate and legal culture has lost all sense of right and 
wrong.” Scandals at companies such as Enron and Worldcom1 have cost thousands of 
employees their jobs and caused thousands of investors to lose their investments
completely2. Enron is probably the most famous of all the U.S. cases3. The company 
operated its energy business for the most part with the help of off-the-books Special 
Purpose Entities (SPEs)4. There – inter alia – the Enron executives covered the 
company’s massive debt while gaining private benefits for themselves5, by providing 
misleading information to the capital markets and its investors6. Enron’s Board of 
directors ignored several obvious red flags, due to a lack of independence from the 
management7 prior to the company’s collapse in December 2001. “The biggest 
accounting scam ever”8 was provided by Worldcom, where expenses were 
misclassified as capital investments9. Within a few days the stock price dropped 
1
 Further companies known for their corporate scandals are: Adelphia Communications 
Corp., Arthur Andersen LLP, Citigroup Inc., Global Crossing Ltd., HealthSouth Corp., ImClone 
Systems Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co., Qwest Communications International Inc., Rite Aid Corp., Tyco 
International Ltd. and Xerox Corp. (see Scandal Scorecard, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at B1, 4 with a 
short description of the corporate frauds and excesses for each single company).
2
 Wiliam H. Widen, Enron at the Margin, 58 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 961 (May 2003), p. 963.
3
 The collapse of Enron Corp. is often classified as the “history’s biggest financial fraud” or 
the “history’s biggest audit failure” (see f. e. William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of 
Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1283 (2002), at pp. 1276-77.
4
 “An SPE is an entity created by a sponsoring firm to carry out a specific purpose or activity, 
or a serried of transactions directly related to a specific purpose and can take many different forms: a 
limited partnership, limited liability company, trust, or corporation (Graziano, 2002).” (Stuart L. 
Gillan & John David Martin, Financial Engineering, Corporate Governance, and the Collapse of 
Enron [working paper, 2002], p. 11).
5
 See Scandal Scorecard, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at B1, 4.; Dylan McClain, Corporate 
Scandals: A User’s Guide, N. Y. TIMES, May 11, 2003, § 3, p., 1; Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. 
Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate Governance Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855 (2003), 
at p. 858. See also Lynn LoPucki, Courting Failure: How Competition for Big Cases is Corrupting 
the Bankruptcy Courts, Draft, June 20, 2004, p. 203 (forthcoming, 2005, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
PRESS) with a very detailed description of what was going on at Enron Corp, as well as Stuart L. 
Gillan & John David Martin, Financial Engineering, Corporate Governance, and the Collapse of 
Enron (working paper, 2002), pp. 5.
6
 See Dylan McClain, Corporate Scandals: A User’s Guide, N. Y. TIMES, May 11, 2003, § 3, 
p., 1., providing a short description of what was going on at Enron Corp.
7
 Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate Governance 
Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855 (2003), at pp. 859.
8 Scandal Scorecard, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at B1, 4.
9
 See for example Dylan McClain, Corporate Scandals: A User’s Guide, N. Y. TIMES, May 
11, 2003, § 3, p., 1.
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around 90 per cent, investors lost $ 180 billions and approximately 20,000 employees 
their jobs.
Due to these scandals investors lost confidence in the capital markets and 
became reluctant to investment. These circumstances have sparked a major debate over
corporate governance. Investors, having lost hundreds of billions of dollars10, pleaded 
for more protection to ensure that such frauds would not happen again. The US 
Congress had only a short time period in which to respond to these events and try to 
prevent the situation from deteriorating further. It had to actively work to restore
investors’ confidence in the capital markets and improve Corporate Governance in 
order to strengthen these markets as soon as possible. Otherwise the US capital market 
and its future growth would have been at a high risk. Congress’s work resulted in the 
implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act11, which was “the most sweeping and 
important US federal securities legislation affecting public companies and other 
market participants since the SEC was created in 1934”12. Sarbanes-Oxley led to a 
severe “tightening up” of securities trading, securities law, and the regulation of 
auditors with the aim of reducing future corporate fraud. The Act sought to sharpen 
Corporate Governance and regain investors’ confidence through enhanced accounting 
rules. These concerns were partly addressed by the implementation of provisions that 
held companies’ boards of directors and auditors more accountable for the promises 
they made in financial statements and other disclosed documents. A greater amount of
information would have to be published by the company in order to give investors a 
more accurate and detailed basis for making their investment decisions. Substantial
parts of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act deal with the stricter and greater demands on, and 
liabilities of, management. In addition, an audit committee, and a provision regarding 
the inspection and documentation of internal quality control systems and their
effectiveness were implemented in order to assure the future creation, storage and 
professional management of information.
However, these kinds of financial failures were not exclusive to the United 
States, and cannot provide a strong argument for the conclusion that only US corporate 
law and corporate governance was “bad” at that point in time. Similar accounting 
scandals could have and in fact did occur elsewhere around the globe, such as in 
Europe where investors in companies such as Parmalat13 and Lernout & Hauspie14, 
where also cheated. The Italian company Parmalat represents one scandal that took 
place in Italy where auditors neglected their duties. There, the entire scandal emerged 
10 Scandal Scorecard (supra note 8).
11
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745; see also Richard A. 
Oppel Jr., Lawmakers Turn to Other Efforts to Deal With Scandals, N. Y. TIMES, July 26, 2002, at C 
6.
12 Ethiopis Tafara, Acting Director, Office of International Affairs, U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, speech before the American Chamber of Commerce in Luxembourg, June 
10, 2003, addressing international concerns under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (full text of the speech 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch061003et.htm; last visited May 6, 2005).
13
 See http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/encyclopedia/P/Pa/Parmalat.htm (last visited May
6, 2005) for a more detailed history of the scandal of Parmalat.
14
 See http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/encyclopedia/L/Le/Lernout_&_Hauspie.htm (last 
visited May 6, 2005) for a more detailed history of the scandal of Lernout & Hauspie.
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in late 2003 after an unexpected collapse of the industry when investigators found out 
what Parmalat was really made of: dubious letters for credit and other worthless 
financial guarantees from overseas subsidiaries in opaque jurisdictions such as the 
Cayman Islands. Besides that, there was nothing. The founder, Calisto Tanzi, and 
fellow Parmalat executive had used Parmalat as a self-service store, ransacking it 
systematically at the expense of investors. The scandal Lernout & Hauspie started 
emerging while Gaston Bastiaens, the CEO, executed a series of acquisitions between 
1996 and 2000 which led Lernout & Hauspie to change from a small software 
company to a giant, worth $10 billion. However, the company became so structurally 
complex that massive fraud could have been hidden quite easily. Although several 
analysts and journalists questioned this complexity and were suspicious, Lernout’s & 
Hauspie’s auditors did not share these concerns. As a result, the fraud went 
undiscovered for quite a long time.
Due to these scandals, the European Union, much like the US Congress, had to 
work to restore investors’ lost confidence and to prevent similar events from 
happening in the future. Aside from its duty to prevent further scandals the European 
Union also had to respond to the US answer to corporate fraud: the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. The European Union had to make sure that it did not lose investors to the United 
States providing them with better protection. Hence, the European Union has been 
very actively engaged in improving its law on capital markets. Several proposals that 
were developed by consultation groups over the past few years were attempted to be 
framed as regulations and directives, having to be implemented by the Member States 
into national law afterwards. The last activity taken within this field was the enactment 
of the Transparency Directive, which entered into force in January, 2005.
Apart from the United States and the European Union working to avoid their 
own scandals, the need for more anti-fraud legislation was also present due to the 
globalization of the market. A global capital market not only provides the opportunity 
to invest in companies regardless of national borders, but it also means that corporate 
failures do no longer stop at national boundaries as would occur if capital markets 
were independent. Therefore, the scandals at Enron and Worldcom had an impact on 
the entire capital market, and caused the European Union to work on improving its 
control over corporate governance. Consequently, the United States and the European 
Union, by far the two biggest economic players15, were faced with the same issues: 
how to ensure that companies are run properly and how to preserve the integrity of the 
markets. In order to implement these goals the European Union has sought talks with 
several other countries, particularly the United States, in order to improve transatlantic 
regulatory cooperation. For instance, the European Commission and the Treasury, 
Securities Exchange Commission and Federal Reserve Board of the United States, 
established the US-EU Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue to promote – according 
to one of their reports:
15 See the testimony of Alexander Schaub, Director-General, DG Internal Market of the 
European Commission before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 
May 13, 2004 (full text of the testimony available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/ext-
dimension/dialogues/index_de.htm; last visited May 6, 2005), p. 2.
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“ … a vibrant, open and competitive transatlantic capital market in 
order to strengthen global growth, offer consumers and investors 
greater choice at lower costs, and bolster the competitive dynamism 
of the global financial industry while ensuring sound regulation. This 
area offers a win-win opportunity for transatlantic cooperation.”16 
Both the United States and the European Union share the belief that they must
work together on improving the global capital market. Since both parties have 
recognized the importance of cooperation, they have each been able successfully
contribute to their common goal:
“… The European Union has moved rapidly forward with its Financial 
Services Action Plan (FSAP), aimed at achieving a uniform legal 
framework for an integrated EU-wide capital market. It has also 
proposed legislation introducing important corporate governance, 
company law, accounting and audit reforms.  
… The United States is moving forward essential measures to 
strengthen investor confidence, pursuant to the President’s 10-point 
plan and the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation.  
… Together, both sides will encourage work to: maintain the highest 
standards of investor protection; promote international convergence 
of accounting standards, including their consistent application, 
implementation, and enforcement; strengthen corporate governance 
on each side of the Atlantic; and lower transaction costs of cross-
border business …”17 
Hence, an improved capital market must eliminate unnecessary burdens where 
possible, especially for companies operating worldwide. The economy has to be 
infused with sufficient capital to achieve growth and stability. Investor confidence in 
the capital markets is an essential basis for this provision, therefore the transparency 
and integrity of the capital markets must be ensured. Only confident investors will
offer to supply the necessary capital, without which the market could not grow or even 
exist. Both the United States and the European Union have had to deal with the issue
of restoring investors’ lost confidence, and both have tried to solve the problem by 
enacting more detailed provisions. 
This paper examines the present trend in the field of law on capital markets
more closely with a particular focus on the European Union. So far, scholars have 
concentrated only – if at all – on summarizing the content of the several directives 
while leaving aside the question whether the legislative activity of the European Union 
in the field of the capital market law is a good or bad policy. 
Since part of the reason for the European Union’s activity is due to the fact that 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been enacted, I begin by providing a brief overview of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (see I.), elaborating in particular on its spirit and purpose (see 
16 ld. 
17 ld.
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I.A.) and its most significant provisions (see I.B.). Hence, the European Union had to
promote its own capital markets, more or less as a response. 
Next, I analyze the European response to the accounting scandals (see II.). I
begin by outlining the development within the European capital markets (see II.A.), 
starting in 1999, a year when the Euro, the European functional currency and the 
exchange ratings for the participating currencies were irrevocably determined, and 
ending in November 2002, just a few months after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act and the High Level Group of Company Law Experts delivered their Final Report 
entitled “A Modern Framework for Company Law in Europe”, to the EU 
Commissioner Frits Bolkenstein. 
The report includes several key issues the European Union should focus on. The 
High Level Group stressed the necessity of improved disclosure provisions, 
independent directors, approval and disclosure of directors’ compensation, an 
increased directors’ responsibility for statements both financial and non-financial, 
easing the access to information for shareholders and cooperation on the issue of
corporate governance among Member States. Based on this High Level Report and 
several other proposals the European Commission issued an action plan entitled:
“Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European 
Union – A Plan to Move Forward”. As a result of this plan several provisions and 
directives were enacted. 
After giving a summary of the most important directives in the field of capital 
market that have been enacted so far (see II.B.), I concentrate on the most recent and 
important directives facing the Member States: The Directive on Market Abuse 
2003/6/EC (see II.C.), the Prospectus Directive 2003/71/EC (see II.D.) and the 
Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC (see II.E.). All of these directives share a 
common focus on regaining investors’ confidence by providing improved information,
leading to more transparency, and hence to more integrated capital markets. 
This high level of legislative activity by the European Union, discussed in 
Chapter II of this paper by focusing on three Directives, raises the question as to the 
direction that the European Union and its Member States are actually heading (see 
III.). I come to the conclusion that due to the United States’ and the European Union’s 
shared goal of regaining investors’ confidence and ensuring strong protection for 
investors, there is reason to believe that both entities are in competition to attract
investors by providing increasing amounts of protection, eventually leading to a 
convergence in their laws on capital markets. This is due to the fact that: (i.) scandals 
occurring in one country also have effects in and on other countries; and (ii.) the 
mobility of capital.
Since the available data indicates that the law on capital markets is moving 
toward greater regulation on a European level as well as toward a uniformity, I 
examine this present trend by focusing on two questions (see IV.): (i.) Does the 
European Union really need to become actively involved in the law on capital markets 
or would it be better off in letting the Member States regulate this field of law on an 
individual basis? (see IV.A.); and (ii.) Are the tremendous number of consultations and 
provisions really necessary or would a well functioning capital market be achieved 
equally well with less activity? (see IV.B.)
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I come to the conclusion (see V.) that although it is preferable attempting to 
achieve harmonization on an EU-wide basis rather than on a national basis and 
although a high level of legislative activity leads to more reliable information and less 
cheating opportunities, the European Union should pursue a lower degree of legislative 
activity. This is due to several reasons: First, capital markets run on faith and trust, 
both of which have been lost due to the accounting scandals. It is therefore good policy 
to try to regain this lost investors’ confidence. Since confidence is a main prerequisite 
for a working capital market, this issue must be considered a top priority. It is unlikely 
however that this can be achieved by simply providing any kind of “bad news”, which 
what is currently happening. Second, the European Union has been very actively 
engaged in improving the capital market during the last years. Due to the short period 
of time in which this activity has taken place there has been no chance for the capital 
markets to react. Therefore, the impact of all the recent actions taken on the capital 
markets is not yet clear. Third, due to the extensive use of public consultations, which 
are intended to make sure that as many interests as possible are taken into 
consideration, the whole system does not fit together as smoothly as it should. 
Moreover, building confidence takes time; it cannot be regained overnight. In addition, 
since investor protection is not cost free, but comes at the expense of profits, 
shareholders might not be willing to pay for it, especially in a few years when the 
scandals have blown over. Consequently, I point out that scandals can never be 
completely eliminated even with the most detailed provisions and regulations. As long 
as “bad guys” are out there with the intention of cheating the investors and stealing 
their money, scandals can never be entirely avoided. This reality should also be taken 
into account when determining the proper degree of legislation so as to ensure that the 
benefits always outweigh the costs.
I. THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO CORPORATE MISCONDUCT – THE 
SARBANES- OXLEY ACT
The United States has led the way in trying to deal with recent occurring 
corporate misconduct and accounting frauds through strong legislative activity. That
activity mainly resulted in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereinafter: the Act)18, which was 
signed into law by President George W. Bush on July 30, 2002. Since the Act entered 
into force19, the capital market has had to face severe legal and economic 
regenerations.
18
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, the Public Company 
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act (see Sec. 801 of the Act).
19
 The Act entered into force on July 30, 2002, the day President George W. Bush signed the 
Act. However, due to different effective dates set up in the Act, some provisions enter into force at a 
later date.
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A. Spirit and purpose
The aim of the Act is to regain lost investors’ confidence in accounting 
principles and their compliance. The Act primarily focuses on improving the auditing 
and information process as this was one of the main weaknesses of the present 
situation and enabled accounting fraud by management happening20. Therefore, it sets 
up uniform standards to guarantee accuracy, correctness and integrity of the financial 
statements in order to protect investors and the public. Up to now the auditing process 
was mainly dominated by private standard setting and private disciplinary measures21. 
This self-policing practice was challenged by the time the first scandals occurred. 
People have lost their confidence in this practice. Hence, the Congress worked on a bill 
which resulted in the Act.
B. Most significant provisions
The main modernizations the Act implicates, concern the auditing process. The 
Act requires the establishment of an independent Accounting Oversight Board, deals 
with the problem of how to ensure auditor independence, boosts public company’s 
directors’ and senior managers’ liability and responsibility, enhances financial 
disclosure, this also with regard to conflict of interests, and provides partly new and 
partly more severe criminal penalties.
1. Accounting Oversight Board.
Title I of Act22 is devoted to the establishment of a public company accounting 
oversight board and its duties. The main tasks of this nonprofit organization23 are 
setting up auditing, quality control and ethics standards for the use of public 
accounting firms in meeting their auditing mandates24. With it, a board has been 
established, which monitors the auditing of public companies being subject to 
securities law25. Thereby a higher quality of the auditors’ work should be ensured26 to 
avoid scandals like Enron in future. Without that setting up of uniform and high 
standards for the auditors, the information provided by the companies and the audit 
reports would be less valuable to their investors and the public. Only if it can be 
warranted that the provided information conforms to the true financial situation of the 
company investors can rely on it, base their decisions on it and recover from their lost 
20
 See e.g. the Enron scandal (supra notes 3-7).
21 See JAMES HAMILTON & TED TRAUTMANN, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002. LAW AND 
EXPLANATION, at p. 14.
22
 Sec. 101 – 109 of the Act (supra note 18).
23 See Sec. 101 (a) of the Act (supra note 18).
24
 See Sec. 103 and Sec. 101 (c) of the Act (supra note 18)..
25
 See Sec. 101 of the Act (supra note 18), stating that the Board should be established “to 
oversee the audit of public companies.
26
 See also the purpose pointed out in Sec. 101 (c) (5) of the Act (supra note 18): “to promote 
high professional standards among, and improve the quality of audit services offered by, registered 
public accounting firms and associated persons thereof”.
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confidence. That’s the main purpose of the Accounting Oversight Board: “to protect 
the interests of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of 
informative, accurate, and independent audit reports for companies the securities of 
which are sold to, and held by and for, public investors.”27
But the Board not only has the power to set up standards, it also has the power 
to enforce them. The Board examines the compliance of each single registered public 
auditing firm with all the auditing and accounting standards, no matter whether they 
were set up by the Act, the Board or the Commission, including the professional 
standards28. Public accounting firms not being registered with the Board are not 
allowed to work on auditing issues and prepare audit reports29. As a further reliability 
and guarantee, the Board’s decisions are being subject to the Commission’s oversight, 
which also means that their set up rules are partly being subject to the Commission’s 
approval before they become effective30.
In order to enable the successful fulfillment of the Board’s duties and hence the 
achievement of the Act’s purpose the Board consists of five people, each of them 
serving on a full-time basis and each of them being independent by not being 
concurrently engaged “in any other professional or business activity” and by receiving 
at most “fixed continuing payments … under standard arrangements for the retirement 
of members of public accounting firms” by public accounting firms31. Thereby a 
personal and/or financial dependence between the Board member and the public 
accounting firm should be prevented so as to provide an equal and objective level 
playing field.
2. Auditor Independence.
Title II of the Act32 also focuses on the auditing process, in particular on the 
auditors themselves. The information provided by the company and verified by the 
auditors becomes more valuable to the investors and the public if the probability of 
cheating by preparing and testifying false statements can be reduced as close to zero as 
possible. Consequently, it is important to keep the auditors as independent as possible 
in order to allow them an open minded judgment on the validity of the provided 
statements. Therefore Title II of the Act works on this issue. 
3. Corporate Responsibility and enhances financial disclosure.
Furthermore, the Act deals in its Title III and IV with the responsibility of 
company directors and senior managers of public companies. Their liability and 
responsibilities were boosted through the Act as managers are going to be held liable 
for the correctness of the statements with the help of a statutory declaration, which is 
27
 Sec. 101 (a) of the Act (supra note 18).
28
 Sec. 104 (a) of the Act (supra note 18).
29
 See Sec. 102 of the Act (supra note 18).
30
 Sec. 107 of the Act (supra note 18).
31
 Sec. 101 (e) of the Act (supra note 18).
32
 Sec 201 – 209 of the Act (supra note 18).
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e.g. determined in Sec. 302 of the Act for financial officers or persons performing 
similar functions. They have to certify in each annual or quarterly report that they have 
reviewed the report and that it is based on their best knowledge. By an increased 
liability and responsibility issue the Congress wanted to deter them from gaining 
private benefits out of the company into their own pocket. Moreover, the direct 
communication between the independent auditors and the management is tried to be 
reduced with the aim of achieving more objective and reliable information. So is e.g. 
the audit committee, consisting of independent members, responsible “for the 
appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any registered public 
accounting firm”33, which emphasizes the need that the auditors have a duty to the 
audit committee, and not to the managers, whose provided data they have to examine 
concerning accuracy34.
One main critical provision can be found in Sec. 404 of the Act, stating “the 
responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal 
control structure and procedures for financial reporting”. Auditing companies 
estimated the costs of addressing this provision of plus 15 -30% for big companies35.
The result of a survey, conducted by Financial Executives, determined the estimated 
costs an affiliated group with expected sales of about 5 billions $ has to face when 
trying to comply with this provision of about 4.7 million $ in the first year and 1.5 
million $ in each of the following years36.
4. Analyst of Conflict of Interests.
The issue of conflict of interest is addressed in Title V of the Act. In particular 
the Act deals with the conflict of interest that can arise “when securities analysts 
recommend equity securities in research reports and public appearances, in order to 
improve the objectivity of research and provide investors with more useful and reliable 
information.”37 Restricting these potential conflict of interest situations by setting aside 
a disclosure provision leads to a improved confidence in the securities research38 by 
investors as they are more likely to judge the provided information as objective as they 
are not being kept out of the information flow any longer.
5. Penalties
The Act imposed in its Title VIII new criminal penalties. Sec. 802 of the Act 
establishes an at least 20-year imprisonment for destruction, alteration, or falsification 
of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy. Other penalties are tightened up, 
33
 Sec 301 of the Act (supra note 18).
34
 See JAMES HAMILTON & TED TRAUTMANN (supra note 21).
35
 See Martin Ottomeier & Isabell Hülsen, Teures Vergnügen. Der Sarbanes-Oxley Act macht 
eine Notierung an der US-Börse auch für deutsche Unternehmen deutlich aufwendiger, FINANCIAL 




 Sec 501 of the Act (supra note 18), amending Sec. 15C of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.)
38
 ld.
European Law on Capital Markets – quo vadis?10
as it is in the case of someone being accused of having destructed corporate audit 
records by not having maintained the papers for a period of five years. He then would 
have to fear a 10-year maximum jail sentence.
II. THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO CORPORATE MISCONDUCT
One of the European Union’s main goals is to provide a genuine “Single 
Market”. The EC-Single Market can only be highly profitable if the capital market and 
its financial services become part of the ongoing harmonization process. Hence, the 
integration of the capital market and its financial services within the European Union 
was given top priority to ensure lower costs of capital and therewith a competitive
European economy39. The need to work on that goal with absolute priority was further 
emphasized when several accounting frauds, occurring in several different countries, 
affected the capital markets worldwide. According to the Internal Market
Commissioner Frits Bolkestein,
“[t]he collapse of Enron has underlined the need to improve the 
quality, regularity and comparability of financial statements by 
publicly traded companies”40 
Therefore, continuous and quick action was needed without any further delay in 
order to promote the European capital market by restoring lost investors’ confidence.
Only therewith markets can develop and grow. Consequently, – according to Frits 
Bolkestein – the European Union had to make clear by legislating directives and 
regulations that
“the European Union has no truck with greedy financial cheats”41,
this also applied to the scandals happening in Europe. Above all, the European 
Union had to respond appropriately to the recent developments in the United States
such as the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act42. 
39
 See e.g. the general comments on the proposal for a Directive on Market Abuse, COM 
(2001) 281 FINAL, at p. 2., available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2001/en_
501PC0281.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005).
40
 See the Press Release, Securities: Commission launches further consultations on 
information that publicly traded companies must disclose, IP/02/684, May 8, 2002, available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/02/684&format=PDF&aged=1&lang
uage=EN&guiLanguage=en, last visited May 6, 2005.
41
 Press Release IP/01/758 from May 30, 2001, available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/press
ReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/01/758&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
(last visited May 6, 2005).
42
 So explicitly the proposal’s statement for a Transparency Directive, COM (2003) 138 
FINAL, at 1.2., available at http://europa.eu.int/cgi-bin/eur-lex/udl.pl?REQUEST=Service-Search&
LANGUAGE=en&GUILANGUAGE=en&SERVICE=all&COLLECTION=com&DOCID=503PC01
38 (last visited May 6, 2005).
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A. The European Capital Market and its Development
1. A Single Currency: The Euro
A primacy goal of the European Union, the implementation of a Single Market,
was advanced by the implementation of the Single Currency. Accordingly, 1999 was a 
year of historical importance for the EU: The Euro was born, the European functional 
currency and the exchange rates for the participating currencies were irrevocably 
determined. For the first time in history sovereign states conveyed their sovereignty in 
the field of finance to a newly created, supranational institution and let their national 
currencies be assimilated into one unique European currency. Three years later, on
January 1st 2002, in 12 of the (at that time) 15 Member States43 Euro notes and coins 
were introduced. The implementation of the Euro as European currency and the 
introduction of a uniform monetary policy have had extensive impacts on the structure 
and the development of a single and efficient European capital market. 
2. Framework for Financial Markets
Another important impact on the European capital market took place on May 
11, 1999, when the European Commission decided on an action plan for financial 
services44. The plan deals with very detailed provisions and goals of how to achieve 
and improve a single market for financial services. The action plan lists 43 measures, 
which should be finalized by the end of 2005, to achieve its strategic objectives of 
providing a single EU wholesale market45, an open and secure retail market,46 and 
state-of-the-art prudential rules and supervision47. Since the submission of the action 
plan, the European Commission has reported its progress twice a year48. The 10th, most 
recent, progress report of June 2, 2004 describes the action plan as having been 
“delivered in full and on time”49 on the EU level. Several directives have been enacted. 
43
 The 12 Member States are Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland. The three remaining Member States 
Denmark, Sweden and the UK still use their national currency. Since May 1st 2004, the EU counts 25 
Member States, as Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus entered. Nevertheless they are not members of the monetary union yet 
and therefore still use their national currencies. Before being able to join the monetary union the 
acceding countries have to fulfill successfully the Maastricht criteria and have to keep for at least two 
years a fixed exchange rate to the Euro.
44
 COM (1999) 232, 11.05.1999. The whole text of the action plan is available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/finances/actionplan/index_en.htm (last visited May 6, 
2005).
45
 ld at pp. 22, with its 19 actions listed. Among others the measure of upgrading the 
directives on prospectus is mentioned under priority 1, meaning that this action should be taken up 
immediately and the. In addition, the importance of the issue “market manipulation” is also pointed 
out, even though only qualified as priority 2 action. 
46
 ld at p. 26 with 9 actions set aside.
47
 ld at p. 28 ff with 10 measures specified. The last 5 actions (p. 31) are simply generally 
necessary to meet the goal of providing an optimal single financial market.
48
 All the progress reports are provided online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/
finances/actionplan/index_en.htm (last visited May 6, 2005).
49 Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index/
progress10_en.pdf, at p. 2 (last visited March 25, 2005).
European Law on Capital Markets – quo vadis?12
Due to the fulfillment of the action plan, the impact of the European Union on the 
international capital market has increased tremendously. However, the Member States 
are still working on the implementations of the directives into national law.
3. Lisbon European Council
According to Articles 98 and 99 EC the Member States lay down their 
economic policies as a matter of common concern and therefore try to coordinate them 
by taking the achievement of the objectives of the European Union into account as 
well. One of these goals was set in spring 2000, when the Heads of State or 
Government of the Member States of the European Union and the President of the 
Commission met under the chairmanship of Portugal, which held the Presidency of the 
Council of the European Union, for the European Council in Lisbon. There the new
long-term goal for the entire European Union, determined to be achieved within a 
decade, was framed: Until the year 2010, the European Union is seeking
“to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.”50 
In order to achieve this goal several tasks have to be fulfilled. One of these tasks 
is – according to the presidency conclusion of the Lisbon European Council – to 
provide efficient and integrated financial markets, which are one of the key factors for 
a growth and employment51. Therefore, the European Council in particular calls for an 
implementation of the Financial Services Action Plan by 2005.
4. Lamfalussy Process
On July 17, 2000 the Council of Economic and Finance Minister (ECOFIN) 
established a Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities 
Markets, chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy. Their main task was to analyze the status 
quo of the securities markets and its regulation in order to make recommendations as 
to how the markets could be better supported to respond to the current movement if 
them. Pursuant to this task, the Committee opened a public consultation seeking input 
from the Member States and other organizations. The initial report on the regulation of 
European securities markets was published on November 9, 200052, the final report 
was issued on February 15, 200153. 
50 Presidency conclusion of the Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000, item 5, 
available at www.europarl.eu.int/summits/lis1_en.htm (last visited May 6, 2005). 
51 ld, item 20. 
52
 The full text of the initial report can be downloaded at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/initial-report-wise-men_en.pdf (last visited May
6, 2005).
53
 See the final report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European 
Securities Markets available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/
wisemen/final-report-wise-men_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005).
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There is a strong consensus that the actions recommended in the action plan 
should be implemented soon with the highest priority54. Moreover, the different rules 
on the cross-border raising of capital weakens the European capital market, prevents
the full advantages of a Single European capital market55. In addition, different 
accounting rules add another reason for the European Union missing out on
opportunities. The European rules, provisions and directives are interpreted by and 
implemented differently by the Member States. Hence, some inconsistencies exist
within the European Union, even though in the fields of European legislation. 
Furthermore, the Committee pointed out that “the European Union’s current regulatory 
framework is too slow, too rigid, complex and ill-adapted to the pace of global 
financial market change”56. The enactment of a Directive can sometimes take years, 
sometimes even decades. Since the capital market responds immediately to changing 
circumstances the European Union has to ensure that it has the ability to respond just 
as quickly. The Lamfalussy process57, a four-level approach, should guarantee this 
rapid adjustment, where necessary, by using a four level approach for European 
legislation in the field of financial services.
In Level 1, the legislation must achieve high level objectives, which are secured 
by a directive or regulation, enacted by the European Parliament and the council of the 
European Union. They only provide a framework; further details are left to be set up in 
the next level. In Level 2, the European Commission sets out the technical details,
which are required to implement the high level objectives framed in step one. In doing 
so, the European Commission receives assistance by the European Securities 
Committee (ESC)58. In Level 3, common standards and guidelines are defined to 
ensure a uniform implementation within the European Union. The Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR)59 will reinforce this implementation process. 
Finally, Level 4 is devoted to the enforcement of the high level objectives and its 
specifications. Here, the Commission inspects the implementation by imposing an 
obligation to report on the Member States.
5. High Level Group of Company Law Experts
A further step was taken by the European Union in September 2001, when the 
European Commission established a Group of High Level Company Law Experts with 
the intention of setting up a discussion on the future of the present corporate law in 
Europe60. Concerning this matter, the Group chaired by the Dutch lawyer Jaap Winter, 
54
 See supra note 53, at p. 10.
55
 This issue was mainly solved by the enactment of the Prospectus Directive (see II.D.)
56
 See supra note 53, at p. 10.
57
 Named after the chairman of the Committee of Wise Men, Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy.
58
 This Committee has been established by Commission Decision 2001/528/EC of 6.6.2001, 
OJ L 191 of 13.7.2001, p. 45
59
 This Committee has been established by Commission Decision 2001/527/EC of 6.6.2001, 
OJ L 191 of 13.7.2001, p. 43.
60
 The online consultation and its very detailed list of questions can be still referred at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/modern/consult/1_en.htm (last 
visited May 6, 2005).
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had – among others61 – the task of making suggestions how the European corporate
law could be improved and modernized, especially with regard to improved Corporate 
Governance to ensure investors’ confidence. 
In November 2002, just a few months after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed, 
the High Level Group of Company Law Experts62 delivered their Final Report63, 
entitled “A Modern Framework for Company Law in Europe” to the EU 
Commissioner Frits Bolkenstein. The report includes several key issues the European 
Union should focus on. The Group especially pointed out the necessity of improved 
disclosure provisions, independent directors, approval and disclosure of directors’ 
compensation, an increased directors’ responsibility for statements (financial and non-
financial), easing the access to information for shareholders, especially using the 
company’s website, cooperation on the corporate governance issue among Member 
States64.
Based on this High Level Report and several other proposals the European 
Commission issued the action plan “Modernising Company Law and Enhancing 
Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to Move Forward”65, which 
was open for public consideration for three months. This action plan’s objectives are:
“- to strengthen shareholders' rights and protection for employees, 
creditors and the other parties with which companies deal, while 
adapting company law and corporate governance rules appropriately 
for different categories of company; 
- to foster the efficiency and competitiveness of business, with special 
attention to some specific cross-border issues.” 
 
The synthesis of the responses showed that the Member States and 
representatives organizations from European and international level all agree on the 
importance of restoring investors’ confidence in capital markets and the EU 
economy66.
61
 Concerning the task on the issue “Takeover Bids” the Group presented their report in 
January 2002.
62 In the literature, this group is also often referred to as the „Winter Group“ as the Final 
report was presented in the Winter of 2002.
63
 The final report and its annexes (165 pages) can be downloaded from the homepage of the 
European Union at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/modern/consult/
report_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005).
64
 See the report itself (supra note 63) or the press release of the High level Group of 
Company Law Experts, Nov. 4, 2002, announcing the presentation of the report to the European 
Commission, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/modern/
consult/presscomm-group_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005).
65
 COM (2003) 284 FINAL of May 21 2003, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/com/cnc/2003/com2003_0284en01.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005).
66 See the synthesis of the responses to the Communication of the Commission to the 
European Council and the European Parliament, Nov. 15, 2003, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/modern/governance-consult-
responses_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005).
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B. Directives in the field of capital market
During the last view years the European Union has, partly based on expertise67,
modernized the law on capital markets very intensively, either by finalizing 
amendments to an already existing directive or by enacting a new directive. For a 
better overview of what is currently happening in the EU and what has been 
happening, a summary of the most important directives in the field of capital market 
law is provided:
- Council Directive 85/611/EEC of 20 December 1985 on the 
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable 
securities, with amendments afterwards (UCITS)68 
- Directive 89/298/EEC of 17 April 1989 coordinating the 
requirements for the drawing-up, scrutiny and distribution of the 
prospectus to be published when transferable securities are offered to 
the public69, repealed as of July 1, 2005 by 2003/71/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the 
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public 
or admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC70.
- Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the capital adequacy of 
investments firms and credit institutions71 
- Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the 
securities field72, repealed by Directive 2004/39/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial 
instruments amending Council Directive 85/611/EEC and 93/6/ECC 
and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC as of April 21, 
200473.
- Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
3 March 1997 on investor-compensation schemes74 
- Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities 
settlement systems75 
67
 See e.g. the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, 
chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy (supra note 53) or The High Level Group of Company Law 
Experts (see II.A.5.).
68
 OJ L 375, 12/31/1985, p. 3. Directive as last amended by Directive 2004/39 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 145, 4/30/2004, p. 1).
69
 OJ L 124, 5/5/1989, p. 8.
70
 OJ L 345, 12/31/ 2003, p. 64.
71
 OJ L 141, 6/11/1993, p. 1. Directive as last amended by Directive 2004/39/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 145, 4/30/2004, p. 1).
72
 OJ L 141, 6/11/1993, p. 27. Directive as last amended by Directive 2002/87/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 35, 2/11/2003, p. 1).
73
 OJ L 145, 4/30/2004, p. 1.
74
 OJ L 084, 3/26/1997, p. 22.
75
 OJ L 166, 6/11/1998, p. 45.
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- Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business 
of credit institutions, with amendments afterwards76 
- Directive 2001/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 28 May 2001 on the admission of securities to official stock 
exchange listing and on information to be published in those 
securities with amendments afterwards77 
- Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation 
(market abuse)78, plus four measures adopted by the Commission 
due to the Lamfalussy process79:
- The Commission Directive 2003/124/EC of December 22, 2003 
implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament 
and the Council as regards the definition and public disclosure of 
inside information and the definition of market manipulation80 
- the Commission Directive 2003/125/EC of December 2003 
implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council as regards the fair presentation of investment 
recommendations and the disclosure of conflict of interest81 
- the Commission Regulation (EC) 2273/2003 of December 22, 
2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC if the European 
Parliament and of the Council as regards exemptions for buy-back 
programmes and stabilization of financial instruments82 
- Commission Directive 2004/72/EC of April 29, 2004 
implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council as regards accepted market practices, the 
definition of inside information in relation to derivatives on 
commodities, the drawing up of lists of insiders, the notification 
of managers’ transactions and the notification and suspicious 
transactions83 
- Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when 
securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and 
76
 OJ L 125, 5/26/2000, p. 1. Directive as last amended by Directive 2004/39/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 145, 4/30/2004, p. 1).
77
 OJ L 184, 7/6/2001, p. 1, corrected in OJ L 217, 8/11/2001, p. 18. Directive as last 
amended by Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 390, 
12/31/2004, p. 38).
In particular the Directive 2001/34/EC replaced Schedule C and Schedule D of the Directive 
79/279/EEC (OJ L 066, 03/16/1979, p. 21) with the new Articles 64 to 69 and 78 to 84 respectively, 
Directive 82/121/EEC (OJ L 048, 02/20/1982, p. 26) with the new Articles 70 to 77 and Articles 102 
to 107, and Directive 88/627/EEC (OJ L 348, 12/17/1988, p. 62).with new Articles 85 to 97 
respectively.
78
 OJ L 96, 4/12/2003, p. 16.
79
 See II.C.2 for more details on these four measures.
80
 OJ L 339, 12/24/2003, p. 70.
81
 OJ L 339, 12/24/2003, p. 73.
82 OJ L 336, 12/24/2003, p. 33.
83
 OJ L 162, 04/30/2004, p. 70.
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amending Directive 2001/34/EC84 plus one measure adopted by the 
Commission due to the Lamfalussy process: 
- Commission Regulation (CE) 809/2004 of April 29, 2004 implementing Directive 
2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards information 
contained in prospectuses as well as the format, incorporation by reference and 
publication of such prospectuses and dissemination of advertisements85
- Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending 
Council Directive 85/611/EEC and 93/6/ECC and Directive 
2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC86 
- Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency 
requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities 
are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending 
Directive 2001/34/EC87 
Regarding to the numerous European Union’s current activities in the field of 
capital markets, it is clear that an enormous shift has happened. The law on capital 
market, once being dominated by national law, is now dominated by the European 
Union’s legislation. Especially during the last few years the European Union has been 
working very actively, especially because of the numerous scandals happening 
worldwide and the enacting of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States. Numerous 
consultations have taken place within a short period of time, resulting in even more 
directives and regulations. The directives themselves only provide a very rough 
framework, but the provisions based on them in accordance with the Lamfalussy 
process are very detailed. Therefore, the Member States are presently inundated with a 
lot of directives they have to transpose into national law, a long the way with working 
on their national law issues. The degree of workload is enormous, this maybe at the 
expense of quality (see III. and IV.).
The most recent and important directives the Member States had and partly still 
have to deal with are thereby the Directive on Market Abuse 2003/6/EC (see below 
C.), the Prospectus Directive 2003/71/EC (see below D.) and the Transparency 
Directive 2004/109/EC (see below E.). All of them are being based on a public 
consultation, all of them are being enacted by using the Lamfalussy process and all of 
them focus on regaining lost investors’ confidence by providing improved information,
leading to more transparency, leading to a more integrated capital market.
C. The Market Abuse Directive (2003/6/EC)
The European Commission listed several targets that are – according to the 
European Commission – required to generate a single efficient market for financial 
84
 OJ L 345, 12/31/ 2003, p. 64.
85
 OJ L 149, 04/20/2004, p. 1.
86
 OJ L 145, 4/30/2004, p. 1.
87
 OJ L 390, 12/31/2004, p. 38.
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services. These targets were released in the Commission’s Communication of May 11, 
1999 entitled “Implementing the framework for financial markets: action plan”. During 
the Lisbon European Council in April 2000 the Member States shared the consensus 
that this action plan should be implemented with priority. One important item of this 
plan was the prevention of market manipulation to get over the present confidence 
crisis the capital market suffers due to worldwide scandals88. With the help of the 
Market Abuse Directive the European Union wanted to address to the public that 
“Europe has no truck with the type of greedy financial cheats who 
have caused so many recent problems. Scandals like Enron show 
clearly the need for strong rules to make markets safer, so that they 
remain free of abuse and free of fraud.”89 
On January 28, 2003, after a seemingly everlasting working process90, the 
Directive on Market Abuse91 was enacted by the European Parliament and the Council
of the European Union. It entered into force on April 12, 2003 and had to be 
implemented into national law by each of the Member States by October 12, 2004. 
Dealing with the issue of market abuse and the final regulation by the European Union 
represents one important milestone on the way towards achieving the goal of “[a]n 
integrated and efficient financial market”. It replaces the old directive 89/592/EEC92
coordinating regulations on insider dealing93, which only dealt with the problem of 
insider trading per se. Hence, the market abuse directive constitutes an enhancement as 
88 Action plan (supra note 44), at p. 5.
89
 So Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, Press Release, Securities markets: 
Commission welcomes European Parliament approval of proposed Market Abuse Directive, 
IP/02/1547, October 24, 2002, available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=IP/02/1547&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited May 6, 
2005).
90
 The history of origins of the Directive on Market Abuse is a very long one. The European 
Commission first proposed the enacting of a consistent and uniform Directive on insider dealing and 
Market Abuse in May 2001 (see press release IP/01/758 [supra note 41]). The full text of the 
proposal, Commission of the European Communities, COM (2001) 281 FINAL, is available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2001/en_501PC0281.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005). After 
having found political agreement on this proposal (see Press Release, IP/02/669, May 7, 2002, 
available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/02/669&format=PDF
&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, last visited May 6, 2005) one important goal determined 
in the action plan could be achieved as the Directive on Market Abuse was enacted on January 28, 
2003. Further measures related to this issue followed due to the Lamfalussy process as CESR started 
working by providing advice (see European Commission, MARKT/F2 D (2001), March 18, 2002, 
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/abuse/marketabuse_en.pdf
(last visited May 6, 2005).
91 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on 
insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) (OJ L 96, 4/12/2003, p. 16).
92
 Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on insider dealing, 
OJ L 334, 18.11.1989, p. 30.
93 See Article 20 of the Directive on Market Abuse (supra note 91): “Directive 89/592/ECC 
… shall be repealed with effect from the date of entry into force of this Directive.” See as well 
Recital 13 of the Directive on Market Abuse (supra note 91). 
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it also responds to the problem of market manipulation for the first time ever94. The 
aim of this common dealing of both (related) issues within one single directive is to 
ensure that there is just one valid framework that sorts out the allocation of 
responsibilities, enforcement, and cooperation95. Therefore, a single directive was 
considered as being more efficient in order to combat insider dealing and market 
manipulation and hence investors being disadvantaged.
1. Spirit and purpose of the Market Abuse Directive
The European Union can only be successful in economic growth and job 
creation (among other important requirements) by having an integrated Single 
European Capital Market96 and thus a “smooth functioning of securities markets and 
public confidence in [these] markets”97. So far, the integrity of the capital market was 
unsatisfactory, as the existing Community legal rules were imperfect within the 
European Union and the national legal rules, if at all existing, differed among the 
Member States98. Therefore, the Directive on Market Abuse addresses the necessity of 
a European standard99 of dealing with insider trading and market manipulation in order 
to improve the conditions for the development of a Single Capital Market and to 
promote market integrity100. Only therewith the “general principle that all investors 
must be placed on an equal footing” can be preserved101. The European Union tries to 
achieve this prerequisite by providing greater transparency102. Greater transparency is 
– according to the European Union – one key element in preventing market abuse, 
which could result out of insider trading (see 2.) or market manipulation (see 3). Both 
types of market abuse possibilities must be cut off in future as otherwise a negative 
impact on the integrity of the capital market as well as harm to investors’ confidence 




 See also the Commission of the European Communities’ proposal for a Directive on 
market abuse, COM (2001) 281 FINAL (supra note 90), at 3.
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 See the press release IP/01/758 (supra note 41) and the Recital 12 of the Directive on 
Market Abuse (supra note 91). 
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 See Recital 1 of the Directive on Market Abuse (supra note 91). 
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 See e.g. the general comments on the Commission of the European Communities’ proposal 
for a Directive on Market Abuse, COM (2001) 281 FINAL (supra note 90), at 2; alike Recital 2 of 
the Directive on Market Abuse (supra note 91). 
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 See Recital 11 of the Directive on Market Abuse (supra note 91). 
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 See the Commission of the European Communities’ proposal for a Directive on Market 
Abuse, COM (2001) 281 FINAL (supra note 90), at 2.
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 See e.g. the press release IP/01/758 (supra note 41).
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COM (2001) 281 FINAL (supra note 90), at 3.
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 See Recital 43, 1st dash, of the Directive on Market Abuse (supra note 91). 
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 See Recitals 2 and 12 of the Directive on Market Abuse (supra note 91). 
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 See e.g. the general comments on the Commission of the European Union’s proposal for a 
Directive on Market Abuse, COM (2001) 281 FINAL (supra note 90), at 2.
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The main purpose for preventing insider dealing is to assure information 
symmetry on the capital market and to avoid any forms of information asymmetry, 
which can emerge on the capital market if insider information (see below a.) is used by 
insiders (see below b.). Due to this insider information the insiders would have an edge 
over the remaining actors on the capital market, so such asymmetry must be
prohibited. As a result, the Directive on Market Abuse provides as a legal consequence 
a ban on insiders making use of inside information (see below c.). Otherwise a
transparent and competitive capital market cannot be obtained.
a. Inside-information. A very detailed definition of ‘inside information’ can be 
found in Article 1 Z 1 of the Directive, which addresses three different issues: In 
general, according to the 1st paragraph, information has to be qualified as inside 
information if it concerns “information of a precise nature which has not been made 
public, relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of financial instruments or 
to one or more financial instruments and which, if it were made public, would be likely 
to have a significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or on the price 
of related derivative financial instruments.”
Whereas this general definition applies if information has “a significant effect 
on the prices of … financial instruments” the information in relation to derivatives is –
according to the 2nd paragraph – qualified as inside information if “users of markets on 
which such derivatives are traded would expect to receive [this information] in 
accordance with accepted market practices on those markets.”105
The 3rd paragraph addresses the issue of inside information for situations in 
which a person charged with the execution of orders concerning financial instruments 
receives information. For such people inside information is also given if the 
information is “related to the client’s pending orders”, “of precise nature, which related 
directly or indirectly to one or more financial instruments” and “if it were made public
… likely to have a significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or on 
the price of related derivative financial instruments.”
b. Insiders. Article 2 (1) of the Directive modifies the previous definition of 
insiders, defined in the predecessor directive 89/592/ECC. It has been retained
unchanged, that any person may be classified as primary insider “who possesses that 
information: (a) by virtue of his membership of the administrative, management or 
supervisory bodies of the issuer; or (b) by virtue of his holding in the capital of the 
issuer; or (c) by virtue of his having access to the information through the exercise of 
his employment, profession or duties”. Until now, nothing has been changed compared 
to the previous understanding of who is to be considered as an insider. What is new is 
105
 Under ‘accepted market practices’ one understands “practices that are reasonably expected 
in one or more financial markets and are accepted by the competent authority in accordance with 
guidelines adopted by the Commission in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 17 (2).” 
(see Article 1 (5) of the Directive on Market Abuse [supra note 91]).
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that person who receives the inside information “by virtue of his criminal activities”106
will be qualified as primary insider.
Besides these primary insiders, the Directive on Market Abuse is also applicable
to secondary insiders, as which – according to Article 4 of the Directive – any 
possessors of inside information are qualified, who know “or ought to have known, 
that it is inside information” what they possess. 
c. Legal consequences. If primary or secondary insiders are in possession of 
inside information they are not allowed to use it, as the Directive provides as a primary 
legal consequence a ban on utilizing the inside information. Therefore insiders are,
according to Article 2 of the Directive, prohibited from using inside information by 
“acquiring or disposing of, or by trying to acquire or dispose of, for his own account or 
for the account of a third party, either directly or indirectly, financial instruments to 
which that information relates.” The Directive only provides an exception to the ban 
on utilizing for “transactions conducted in the discharge of an obligation that has 
become due to acquire or dispose of financial instruments where that obligation results 
from an agreement concluded before the person concerned possessed inside 
information.”107
Besides the utilization prohibition mentioned in Article 2, the Directive also 
provides a second legal consequence in Article 3: a ban on disclosing the information
to third parties or making recommendations. Therefore, according to this Article, both 
types of insiders, primary or secondary, are prohibited from “(a) disclosing inside 
information to any other person unless such disclosure is made in the normal course of 
the exercise of this employment, profession or duties” or “(b) recommending or 
inducing another person, on the basis of inside information, to acquire or dispose of 
financial instruments to which that information relates.”
d. Special provision for a legal person being the insider. In cases of a legal 
person being an insider all the legal consequences mentioned in Article 2 (1) of the 
Directive (prohibition of utilizing) and Article 3 (prohibition of disclosing and 
recommending) “also apply to the natural persons who take part in the decision to 
carry out the transaction for the account of the legal person concerned.”108 In this 
regard, the previous rule of the Directive 89/592/ECC has been adopted.
e. Disclosure duties. As inside information used by an insider leads to a harmful 
information asymmetry on the capital market, the Directive on Market Abuse provides 
in its Article 6 full disclosure duties for the issuers of financial instruments. However
this does not mean that any kind of inside information has to be published by every 
issuer of financial instruments. According to Article 6 Z 1 of the Directive the issuers 
106
 See also Recital 17 of the Directive on Market Abuse (supra note 91), where it is 
expressly mentioned that ”account should be taken of cases where inside information originated not 
from a profession or function but from criminal activities”.
107
 Article 2 (3) of the Directive on Market Abuse (supra note 91). 
108
 Article 2 (2) of the Directive on Market Abuse (supra note 91). 
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of financial instruments only have to release inside information “which directly 
concerns the said issuers”. Further, only issuers are affected by the disclosure duties, 
whose financial instruments are “admitted to trading on a regulated market in at least 
one Member State, or for which a request for admission to trading on such a market 
has been made”109.
If an issuer of financial instruments is in possession of inside information that is 
– according to Article 6 and 9 of the Directive – burdened with a disclosure duty, the 
issuer has to “inform the public as soon as possible”110. This would mean that the 
issuer has to restore information symmetry on the capital market with the least possible 
delay. A delay in informing the public ‘immediately’ is – according to Article 6 Z 2 of 
the Directive – only granted under the issuer’s own responsibility on three conditions:
First, the issuer’s own legitimate interests would have to be prejudiced by a prompt 
disclosure. Second, the non-disclosure must not “likely … mislead the public”. Third, 
the issuer of the financial instruments has to be “able to ensure the confidentiality of 
that information.”
3. Market manipulation
In order to facilitate the development of capital markets that investors can rely 
on, and therefore in which they are likely to put their money in, the Directive also 
deals with market manipulation. With it, this form of market abuse was adjusted for 
the first time ever. Without the prevention of market manipulation a sufficient market 
transparency could not develop, which would in turn mean that not all economic 
traders would be able to take part in the capital market’s trading111.
a. ‘market manipulation’. According to Article 1 Z 2 of the Directive112 one has 
to distinguish between two kinds of market manipulation: the possibility of rigging the 
market by transactions or orders to trade113 or by disseminating false information 
through the media114. Due to this very broad definition the European Union wanted to 
assure that procedures of market manipulation emerging in the future are already 
addressed by the scope of the Directive115.
According to lit a leg cit market manipulation includes transactions or orders to 
trade “which give, or are likely to give, false or misleading signals as to the supply of, 
demand for or price of financial instruments”. The same applies to transactions or 
109
 Article 9 of the Directive on Market Abuse (supra note 91). 
110
 Article 6 (1), first sentence of the Directive on Market Abuse (supra note 91). 
111
 See Recital 15 of the Directive on Market Abuse (supra note 91). 
112
 The definition is – intentionally – kept very broad and flexible due to the fact that markets 
are changing rapidly. Thereby it should be assured that the definition is still in line with the market 
during the next decades (see the press release IP/01/758 [supra note 41]). 
113
 See Article 1 (2) (a) and (b) of the Directive on Market Abuse (supra note 91). 
114
 See Article 1 (2) (c) of the Directive on Market Abuse (supra note 91). 
115
 See the Commission of the European Communities’ proposal for a Directive on Market 
Abuse, COM (2001) 281 FINAL (supra note 90), at 4.
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orders to trade “which secure, by a person, or persons, acting in collaboration, the price 
of one or several financial instruments at an abnormal or artificial level”. 
However, transactions or orders to trade are not qualified as manipulating the 
market if “the person who entered into the transactions or issued the orders to trade 
establishes that his reasons for so doing are legitimate”. Nevertheless, such 
transactions or orders have to comply with the “accepted market practices on the 
regulated market concerned”.
Besides the above mentioned form of manipulating the market by transactions 
or orders to trade one will also be charged, according to Article 1 Z 2 lit b of the 
Directive, with rigging the market if the transactions or orders to trade make use of
“fictitious devices or any other form of deception or contrivance.”
Article 1 Z 2 lit c of the Directive deals with the second way of manipulating 
the market, which be achieved by a “dissemination of information through the media, 
including the Internet, or by any other means, which gives, or is likely to give, false or 
misleading signals as to financial instruments”. Hence, this problem is addressed by 
Article 1 Z 2 lit c of the Directive. In particular, “the dissemination of rumours and 
false or misleading news” is being covered by this rule. Furthermore, it is required that 
“the person, who made the dissemination knew, or ought to have known, that the 
information was false or misleading.”
As mainly journalists might be affected by this definition of market 
manipulation, Article 1 Z 2 lit c of the Directive refers to the dilemma they have to 
face. They are stuck between market manipulation on the one side and freedom of the 
press on the other. Therefore, the Directive lays down in leg cit that the Directive on 
Market Abuse does not apply to journalists, in order to guarantee the freedom of 
press116. In fact, journalists acting in their capacity as professionals are rather governed 
by their professional rules than by the rules specified in this Directive. Nonetheless 
they may be charged with violating the Directive on Market Abuse if they “derive, 
directly or indirectly, an advantage or profits from the dissemination of the information 
in question.”
b. Legal consequence. The legal consequence of market manipulation is, 
compared to the ones of insider dealing clearly, briefly and concisely determined. 
“Any person [is banned] from engaging in market manipulation.” Consequently, this 
rule applied to any natural person as well as to any legal person.
4. Supervisory body
In order to achieve the most efficient control of compliance with the Directive 
on Market Abuse, each Member State of the European Union has to – according to 
Article 11 of the Directive – designate one administrative authority to be its
supervisory body. Therewith an overlapping of responsibilities should be avoided, 
which would do more harm than good since an ambiguous allocation of rights and 
duties is likely to create more costs than benefits. Besides, only thereby a convergent 
116
 See Press Release, IP/02/1547 (supra note 89).
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rather than a distinguished, implementation and enforcement of the Directive can be 
assured117. 
5. Further European enforcing provisions
The Directive on Market Abuse is the first directive to be agreed using the 
Lamfalussy process118. The Committee of European Securities Regulation (CESR) and 
the European Securities Committee (ESR) have been actively involved in advising the 
Commission on the issue of insider dealing and market manipulation. As a result of 
this consultation process the Commission has published three working documents as 
part of the first Level of the Lamfalussy process119. These three working documents 
deal with the issues of defining inside information, market manipulation and the public 
disclosure of inside information by the issuer120, the issue of presenting 
recommendations and relevant interests or conflicts of interests121 and the issue of 
117 See Press Release, IP/01/758 (supra note 41).
118
 See Press Release, Securities markets: Commission welcomes Council’s adoption of 
Market Abuse Directive, IP/02/1789, December 3, 2002, available at http://europa.eu.int/
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/02/1789&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLan
guage=en (last visited May 6, 2005).
119
 See Press Release, Market abuse: Commission published three working documents 
concerning the first implementing measures for Market Abuse Directive, IP/03/345, March 10, 2003, 
available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/345&format=PDF
&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited May 6, 2005).
120
 Regarding the Articles 1 and 6, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Directive see DG Internal 
Market, DG Internal Market Services’ Working Document on the Implementation of Article 1 and 
Article 6 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/6/EC on Insider 
Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), WORKING DOCUMENT ESC 12/2003, March 10, 
2003, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/abuse/esc-12-2003/esc-
12-2003_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005) ; European Securities Committee (Alternates), Commission 
draft proposal for a directive implementing Article 1 and Article 6 paragraph 1 and 2 of the European 
Parliament and Council Directive 2003/6/EC on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market 
Abuse), WORKING DOCUMENT ESC 22/2003, July 10, 2003, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internal_market/securities/docs/abuse/esc-22-2003/esc-22-2003_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005) , 
WORKING DOCUMENT ESC 22/2003 – REV 1, September 19, 2003, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/abuse/esc-22-2003/esc-22-2003-
rev1_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005), WORKING DOCUMENT ESC 22/2003 – REV 2, October 29, 
2003, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/abuse/esc-22-2003/esc-
22-2003-rev2_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005) and WORKING DOCUMENT ESC 22/2003 – FINAL 
VERSION, October 29, 2003, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/
docs/abuse/esc-22-2003/esc-22- 2003-final_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005).
121
 Regarding Article 6, paragraph 5 of the Directive see DG Internal Market, DG Internal 
Market Services’ Working Document on the Implementation of Article 6 paragraph 5 of the 
European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/6/EC on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation 
(Market Abuse), WORKING DOCUMENT ESC 13/2003, March 10, 2003, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/abuse/esc-13-2003/esc-13-2003_en.pdf
(last visited May 6, 2005); European Securities Committee (Alternates), Commission draft proposal 
for a directive implementing Article 6 paragraph 5 of the European Parliament and Council 
Directive 2003/6/EC on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), WORKING 
DOCUMENT ESC 23/2003, July 10, 2003, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_
market/securities/docs/abuse/esc-23-2003/esc-23-2003_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005), WORKING 
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exemptions of the scope of the Directive on Market Abuse in special cases122. These 
first implementing measures were adopted by the Commission in December 2003123, 
describing the aforementioned three issues in more detail as the Directive on Market 
Abuse itself only provides a general framework. So the problem of inside dealing and 
market manipulation is not solely addressed by the Directive on Market Abuse, but 
rather by two additional Commission Directives and one additional Commission 
Regulation as well124.
Within a second set of measures the Commission adopted, advised by the 
CESR, a further technical Directive125, focusing on the accepted market practices 
within the context of market manipulation, the definition of inside information in 
relation to derivatives on commodities, the drawing up of lists of insiders by issuers 
and persons acting on their behalf or for their account and the notification to the 
relevant authorities of suspicious transactions and of transactions undertaken by the 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/abuse/esc-23-2003/esc-23-2003-
rev2_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005)  and WORKING DOCUMENT ESC 23/2003 – final version, 
October 29, 2003, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/abuse/esc-
24-2003/esc-24-2003-final_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005).
122
 Regarding Article 8 of the Directive see DG Internal Market, DG Internal Market 
Services’ Working Document on the Implementation of Article 8 of the European Parliament and 
Council Directive 2003/6/EC on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), 
WORKING DOCUMENT ESC 14/2003, March 10, 2003, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internal_market/securities/docs/abuse/esc-14-2003/esc-14-2003_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005); 
European Securities Committee (Alternates), Commission draft proposal for a regulation 
implementing article 8 of the European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/6/EC on Insider 
Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), WORKING DOCUMENT ESC 24/2003, July 10, 
2003, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/abuse/esc-24-
2003/esc24-2003_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005), WORKING DOCUMENT ESC 24/2003 – REV 1, 
September 19, 2003, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/
abuse/esc-24-2003/esc24-2003-rev1_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005), WORKING DOCUMENT ESC
24/2003 – REV 2, October 29, 2003, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/
securities/docs/abuse/esc-24-2003/esc24-2003- rev2_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005) and WORKING 
DOCUMENT ESC 24/2003 – final version, October 29, 2003, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/abuse/esc-23-2003/esc-23-2003-
final_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005).
123
 See Press Release, Market abuse: Commission adopts first implementing measures, 
IP/04/16, January 1, 2004, available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
IP/04/16&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited May 6, 2005).
124
 These are the Commission Directive 2003/124/EC of December 22, 2003 implementing 
Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and the Council as regards the definition and public 
disclosure of inside information and the definition of market manipulation (OJ L 339, 12/24/2003, p. 
70); the Commission Directive 2003/125/EC of December 2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the fair presentation of investment 
recommendations and the disclosure of conflict of interest (OJ L 339, 12/24/2003, p. 73); and the 
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if the European Parliament and of the Council as regards exemptions for buy-back programmes and 
stabilization of financial instruments (OJ L 336, 12/24/2003, p. 33).
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 Commission Directive 2004/72/EC of April 29, 2004 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards accepted market practices, the definition of 
inside information in relation to derivatives on commodities, the drawing up of lists of insiders, the 
notification of managers’ transactions and the notification and suspicious transactions (OJ L 162, 
04/30/2004, p. 70.
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issuer’s managers126. Therefore the Directive on Market Abuse has always to be 
viewed in regard to these four measures.
D. The Prospectus Directive (2003/71/EC)
Another important step towards the fulfillment of the goals determined in the 
action plan127 and agreed upon by the Heads of State and Government of the Member 
States of the European Union during the Lisbon European Council in March 2000128, is
the Prospectus Directive129. The first proposal was submitted on May 30, 2001130, the 
final directive was then enacted by the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union on November 4, 2003, entering into force on December 31, 2003 after 
a second, amended proposal having been made131. Furthermore, the directive must be 
implemented into national law by each of the Member States by July 1, 2005.
The Prospectus Directive substitutes the old directive 89/298/EEC of April 17, 
1989132, coordinating the requirements for the drawing up, scrutiny and distribution of 
the prospectus to be published when transferable securities are offered to the public133
and disclosure duties in Directive 2001/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
126
 See Press Release, Securities: Commission adopts two technical measures to implement 
the Prospectuses and Market Abuse Directives, IP/04/563, April 29, 2004, available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/563&format=PDF&aged=1&lang
uage=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited May 6, 2005).
127
 See action plan (supra note 44) at p. 6.
128
 See the presidency conclusion of the Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000 
(supra note 50), item 21.
129 Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 
on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and 
amending Directive 2001/34/EC (OJ L 345, 12/31/2003, p. 64).
130
 After two years of substantial discussion among the Commission, the Member States’ 
Governments, the Securities Regulators and the market participants (see European Commission, The 
Proposed Prospectus Directive. Frequently Asked Questions, MARKT F2/HGD/NDB D (2001), 
September 28, 2001, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/
prospectus/2001-09-faq_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005). 
131
 See Press Release, Financial services: Commission presents an amended proposal on 
prospectuses, IP/02/1209, August 9, 2002, available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=IP/02/1209&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last 
visited May 6, 2005). The full text of the second, Amended proposal for a Directive on the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the 
public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, COM (2002) 460 FINAL, August 
9, 2002, taking particular into account the Parliament’s and the Council’s concern, is available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2002/com2002_0460en01.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005).
132 Having been criticized by issuers and investment banks as not achieving the aim of 
facilitating the capital raising process (see Press Release, Proposed Directive on Prospectuses. 
Frequently Asked Questions, MEMO/01/204, May 30, 2001, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/01/204&format=PDF&aged=1
&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited May 6, 2005). The need to upgrade this old directive 
has also been pointed out in the action plan (supra note 44).
133
 OJ L 124, 5.5.1989, p. 8.
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Council of 28 May 2001 on the admission of securities to official stock exchange 
listing and on information to be published on those securities134
1. Spirit and purpose of the Prospectus Directive
According to Article 1 of the Prospectus Directive, the main purpose of the 
Directive “is to harmonise requirements for the drawing up, approval and distribution 
of the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted 
to trading on a regulated market situated or operating within a Member State.”
Attainment of this goal is sought by a “single passport” for issuers135. With it, “the 
widest possible access to investment capital on a Community-based basis”136 should be 
enabled. This simplification has an enormous positive impact on the entire European 
capital market as only one prospectus is needed by a company in order to acquire 
capital throughout the European Union. Hence, costs can be saved and impediments 
reduced137. However, the flipside of this broadly access should not be disregarded: The 
broader the access, the bigger the probability of investors being cheated. Therefore it is 
important to pay attention to investor protection138. To achieve the most efficient 
result, this protection should be provided on a Community level139. Therefore, the 
Directive deals extensively with the prospectus itself and the information therein 
provided as the “[i]nformation is a key factor in investor protection”140. Accordingly it 
has to be assured by the Member States that investors can rely on the information 
provided141.
134
 OJ L 184, 6.7.2001, p. 1.
135 See the presidency conclusion of the Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000 
(supra note 50), item 21.
136
 See Press Release, Financial services: Commission proposes single prospectus valid EU-
wide, IP/01/759, May 30, 2001, available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do
?reference=IP/01/759&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited May 6, 
2005); Recital 4 of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129).
137
 See the action plan (supra note 44) at p. 6.
138 Recital 10 of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129).
139 Recital 20 of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129). 
140 Recital 21 of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129). 
141 Recital 27 of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129). 
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2. Obligation to publish a prospectus
The cornerstone of the Prospectus Directive is the prospectus itself. The 
Prospectus Directive sets out in its Article 3 two circumstances when a company is 
obliged to publish a prospectus. First, this obligation applies prior to “any offer of 
securities142 to be made to the public”143 within the territory of the European Union. 
Second, the publication is also a requirement for “any admission of securities144 to 
trading on a regulated market situated or operating” within the territory of the 
European Union145. For both, the same rule applies, no further differentiations are 
necessary. 
a. offers of securities to the public. For the first time ever the directive defines –
very amplified – the meaning of ‘offers of securities to the public’. Accordingly, the 
term means a “communication to persons in any form and by any means, presenting 
sufficient information on the terms of the offer and the securities to be offered, so as to 
enable an investor to decide to purchase or subscribe to these securities.”146 This 
definition does not indicate that a precise opportunity to a purchase of securities or 
subscription must exist, but nevertheless it indicates that the offer must contain all the 
necessary data to help an investor in making a purchase decision. This of course also 
implies data concerning the point of time and modality of a potential acquisition by 
purchase or subscription.
Having set out the basic principle of when a prospectus has to be published, 
which seems to be quite extensive, this general rule has to be put into perspective, as 
the directive sets aside various exceptions147 while making a public offer of 
securities148. 
First, - according to Article 3 Z 2 lit a – the publishing of the prospectus is not 
required in regards to offers directed solely to qualified investors149. This means, 
according to the definition of ‘qualified investors’ set up in Article 2 Z 1 lit e of the 
directive, that offers solely addressed to national and regional governments, central 
banks or international and supranational institutions are not covered by the obligation 
to publish a prospectus. Furthermore, institutional investors such as credit institutions, 
142
 Offers of some types of securities are released from the obligation to publish a prospectus; 
see Article 4 (1) of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129). 
143 Article 3 (1) of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129). 
144
 Again, some types of securities are not covered by the obligation to publish a prospectus if 
they are applied to be admitted to trading in a regulated market within the European Union.
145
 Article 3 (2) of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129). 
146
 Article 2 (1) (d) of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129). 
147
 See Article 3 (2) of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129). 
148 Note that these exceptions require a public offer of securities. However, the obligation to 
publish a prospectus may still exist due to the fact that any admission of securities to trading on a 
regulated market also required a published prospectus. Hence, these exceptions only apply to the 
obligation set aside in Article 3 (1) of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129), but not the one 
determined in Article 3 (3) leg cit.
149 The following enumeration is just one in extracts to exemplify the understanding of 
qualified investors and is by far not complete. For a complete list of who is going to be considered as 
‘qualified investors’ see Article 2 (1) (e) of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129). 
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investment firms, insurance companies or pension funds are also released from the 
obligation if their “corporate purpose is solely to invest into securities” as well as large 
legal entities150. In addition, certain natural persons and certain small and medium-
sized entities might ask to be considered as qualified investors. Irrespective of these 
substantial exceptions an obligation might nevertheless result from the fact that any 
admission of securities to trading on a regulated market within the European Union 
requires a published prospectus (Article 3 Z 3). The exceptions just set aside do not 
apply to this case.
Second, private placements shall also not be subject- to the obligation. 
Therefore, in cases where securities are offered to less than 100 persons (natural or 
legal), calculated per Member State, those will not be covered by the obligation either. 
As an offer addresses to qualified investors is already released by Article 3 Z 2 lit a, 
they do not count here either for the calculation of the 100 persons limit151.
Furthermore, offers with a minimum total consideration or denomination, are 
not considered for the obligation either152. The limit is sized with EUR 50.000, hence
compared to the previous regulation, the limit has been increased slightly from EUR 
40.000 to 50.000 and therefore the scope for the obligation to publish a prospectus 
slightly increased.
b. Admission of securities to trading on a regulated market. As the Prospectus 
Directive applies to any kind of admission to a regulated market, the same rules apply, 
no matter whether one trades of the official or on the regulated market153.
3. Form and content of the prospectus
Chapter II of the Directive (Articles 5 to 12) deals with the form and content of 
the prospectus. As a matter of principle, one can say that these provisions mainly try to 
address the overriding principle of giving the investors sufficient and accurate 
information to make their decision without being cheated. This includes that all 
information has to be provided to give the investors the ability to get an idea of the 
financial situation of the company. Therefore Article 5 Z 1 of the directive clearly 
points out that investors have to be informed in a way that enables them “to make an 
informed assessment of the assets and liabilities, financial position, profit and losses, 
and prospects of issuer and of any guarantor, and of the rights attaching to such 
securities.”
150
 These are the ones that are not qualified as small and medium-sized enterprises according 
to the definition in Article 2 (1) (f) of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129). 
151 So explicitly Article 3 (2) (b) of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129): „other than 
qualified investors“.
152 See Article 3 (2) (c) and (d) of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129). 
153
 See Kai-Michael König, Die neue europäische Prospektrichtlinie. Eine kritische Analyse 
und Überlegungen zur Umsetzung in das deutsche Kapitalmarktrecht, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
EUROPARECHTLICHE STUDIEN 2004, at p. 258.
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a. Form. Concerning the form of the prospectus the directive leaves the choice 
to the issuer, offeror or person, asking for the admission to trading on a regulated 
market whether to produce the prospectus in the traditional form of a single document 
or in separates ones154. Opting for the latter means that the required information has to 
be split up in three documents: the registration document, including all the data related 
to the issuer, the securities note, including all the data related to the security for which 
a public offer is going to be made or for which an admission to trading on a regulated 
market is requested and the summary note, including the summary describing the 
security itself and the risks that are involved.
Hence, the most important part of the prospectus turns out to be the summary 
note which is a main modernization to the previous directive. The main purpose of this 
obligation of providing lots of information to future investors is simply to achieve 
transparency and integrity on the capital market, according to the goal laid down in the 
action plan155. Investors should be able to reach the decision of purchasing or 
subscribing certain securities as well informed as possible, taking all the risk into 
account. No information asymmetry should prevent them from doing so. Thus, the 
prospectus should include in a brief156 and simply written manner “the essential 
characteristics and risks associated with the issuer, any guarantor and the securities”157. 
Annex IV to the directive further clarifies the main content of the summary. 
So far, one main problem of the prospectus has been its translation into the 
language of the host Member State. Hence, the access to the entire European capital 
market was severely affected due to the different languages spoken in the European 
Union. Article 19 of the Directive addresses this problem by providing easier access. If 
a prospectus is used in the host Member State the facilitation of Multi-State use is 
demonstrated by the choice of either drawing it up in the language the competent 
authorities of the host Member State accepts or by using a language customary in the 
sphere of international finance158, which will normally be English159. The choice is up 
to the issuer, the offeror or the person asking for admission. Hence, it is most likely 
that the decision is in favor of using the common language within the field of finance, 
which would be English. This option leads to substantial improvement for making 
offers to the public or asking for admission to trading on a regulated market in a host 
Member State. However, where the prospectus should only be addressed to the home 
Member State, the language accepted by the competent authority of the home Member 
State must be used160. In such a case no option for using the international finance 
154 Article 5 (3) of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129). 
155
 Action plan (supra note 44).
156 According to Recital 21 of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129) the summary should 
not exceed the limit of 2500 words in the language it was originally issued in.
157 Article 5 (2) of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129). 
158 Article 19 (2) of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129). 
159
 See Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the 
public or admitted to trading, COM (2001) 280 FINAL, at 4., available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/com/pdf/2001/en_501PC0280.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005).
160 Article 19 (1) of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129). 
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language is provided, which might be a problem for those home Member States whose 
competent authorities do not use English as official language. Only in cases of an 
“admission to trading on a regulated market of non-equity securities whose 
denomination per unit amounts to at least EUR 50 000”, these prospectus can always 
be drawn up in English. Despite this exception, it is most likely that the home Member 
State will also accept a prospectus in English (at least in the long run) in all the other 
cases to avoid any competitive disadvantages they might otherwise face.
Another renewal is set aside in Article 11 concerning the incorporation by 
references. According to this provision, the incorporation of information by using 
references is permitted. However, to avoid evasion and consequent cheating of
investors, this admission of external documents into the prospectus is tied to certain 
requirements. These requirements make sure that the standard of external documents is 
as high as the one of the prospectus itself. Therefore, the documents referred to also 
have to be published, either before the approval and publication of the prospectus or at 
least simultaneously with it. What’s more, these documents also have to be “approved 
by the competent authority of the home Member State or filed with it in accordance 
with this Directive, in particular pursuant to Article 10, or with Titles IV and V of 
Directive 2001/34/EC.” So the integrity of the capital market can be guaranteed. 
Integrity must also be secured after the approval of the prospectus. This 
becomes particularly important as circumstances can change between the approval of 
the prospectus and the final closing to the market or the beginning of the trading on a 
regulated market. At such times, the protection of investors is at least as important, if 
not even more, as they could otherwise rely on false or incomplete information, 
especially as they are likely to trust the approval of the prospectus. This problem is 
addressed by Article 16 of the Directive, which sets up the obligation to draw up a 
supplement to the prospectus if circumstances might have changed that could affect the 
assessment of the securities. With this provision it should be assured that the investors 
receive complete and truthful information, which will serve them as a basis on which 
to make their purchase decision. 
b. Content. The Prospectus Directive covers the entire prospectus issue, is set 
out as a maximum harmonization provision. For this reason, the Directive also applies 
if securities are offered only to the public of the home Member State. The same applies 
with regard to the admission of securities to trading solely on the regulated market of 
the home Member State. No additional requirements besides the ones set up in the 
Directive may be claimed by the Member States. Here, the Directive does not give any 
leeway to the Member States. The demands on the prospectus should be the same 
within the entire European Union; no further distinctions should be made. Only with 
such a strict maximum harmonization can the goal of one entire capital market be 
achieved, where the investor can rely on the prospectus, being secured by a European 
standard that has been set aside.
Concerning the content itself the Prospectus Directive does not determine that 
much. This is due to the fact, that the European Union has made use of the Lamfalussy 
procedure for the prospectus issue. Hence, according to Level 1 of that procedure the 
Directive only determined the framework very roughly, leaving determination of the 
European Law on Capital Markets – quo vadis?32
more detailed content requirements to the Commission in Level 2. According to the 
Commission Regulation (CE) 809/2004161 the disclosure requirements vary by the type 
of issuer and the type of securities. Therefore the Commission Regulation includes
several annexes, listing the minimum requirement the prospectus has to contain for 
each of the different models. Furthermore further details are being listed as to being 
obliged to publish for certain special cases (building block approach).
4. Time for publication
Once the prospectus has been approved, the prospectus must be made public. 
According to Article 14 this publication has to be made “as soon as practicable and in 
any case, at a reasonable time in advance of, and at the latest at the beginning of, the 
offer to the public or the admission to trading of the securities involved.”
5. Further European enforcing provisions
The Prospectus Directive was another one making use of the Lamfalussy 
process. In March 2002 the Committee of European Securities Regulation (CESR) 
started working on implementing measures on market abuse and prospectus162. Finally, 
on the basis of the DG Internal Market Services’ working document163 the 
Commission adopted a technical measure to implement the Prospectus Directive: the 
Commission Regulation (CE) 809/2004164. It determines the various forms of 




 After technical advice having been requested by the Commission. See therefore European 
Commission, Provisional Request for Technical Advice on Possible Implementing Measures on the 
Future Directive on the Prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or 
admitted to trading, MARKT/F2 D (2001), ;March 18, 2002, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/prospectus/cesr-docs/2002-03-request-
advice_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005) and the  Press Release, Securities markets: Commission asks 
CESR to begin work on implementing measures on market abuse and prospectuses, IP/02/480, March 
27, 2002, available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/02/480
&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited May 6, 2005). Moreover see 
European Commission, Additional provisional mandate to CESR for Technical Advice on Possible 
Implementing Measures concerning the Future Directive on the prospectus to be published when 
securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading, MARKT/F2 D (2002), January 31, 2003, 
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/prospectus/cesr-docs/2003-01-
mandate_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005). The formal mandate was given on October 1, 2003, 
MARKT/G2, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/prospectus/cesr-
docs/2003-10- request-advice_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005). 
163
 DG Internal Market, DG Internal Market Services’ working document on the 
implementation of Articles 5, 7, 10, 11, 14 and 15 of the European Parliament and Council Directive 
2003/71/EC on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to 
trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, WORKIND DOCUMENT ESC 
36/2003, November 2003, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/
prospectus/esc-36- 2003/workdoc-esc-36-2003_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005). 
164
 Commission Regulation (CE) 809/2004 of April 29, 2004 implementing Directive 
2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards information contained in 
prospectuses as well as the format, incorporation by reference and publication of such prospectuses 
and dissemination of advertisements (OJ L 149, 04/29/2004, p. 1).
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Prospectus Directive does not create a “one-size fits all” prospectuses165; rather it let it 
open to the Commission to determine minimum disclosure requirements for the 
various kinds of products. The Regulation (CE) 809/2004 also specifies the content of 
prospectuses further. “It lays down rules on the publication of the additional 
information which the Prospectus Directive requires to be published outside the 
prospectus itself. In addition, the Regulation sets out the conditions issuers must meet 
when making information available by referring in the prospectus to other documents 
published previously or simultaneously. Finally, in order to ensure that interested 
parties have adequate access to prospectuses, the implementing measure includes 
requirements on how these must be published and advertised.”166
E. Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC)
The European Union’s main goal is to provide a genuine Single Market. 
“[E]fficient, transparent and integrated securities markets contribute to”167 that goal. 
Hence, the European Union has focused on improving the Community’s securities 
markets during the last few years. Working on the transparency issue EU-wide is one 
way of providing such enhanced securities markets. Providing more and improved
transparency leads to a cutback of information asymmetry among market participants 
and hence reduces surprises which are harmful for an integrated market, which is 
mainly based on investors’ confidence. Additionally, due to mergers between 
European stock exchanges further evidence for the need of EU-wide, almost real-time 
information is provided168.
The existing legislation was about twenty years old169. In order to respond to the 
evolution of the markets an update was urgently required. By enacting the 
Transparency Directive170 the action plan, including 43 measures, was finalized171. The 
165




 See Recital 1 of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
168
 See the First Consultation Document of the Services of the Internal Market Directorate 
General on transparency obligations of issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated 
market from July 11, 2001, at 3., available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/
docs/transparency/consultation1/euregime_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005).
169
 In particular these are the Directives 79/279/EEC (supra note 77), 82/121/EEC (supra
note 77) and 88/627/EEC (supra note 77). With the Directive  2001/34/EC (supra note 77) each of 
those three Directives were repealed, involving no substantive changes (see the press release 
IP/01/1861, available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/01/1861&
format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, last visited May 6, 2005).
170 Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 
2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers 
whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC 
(OJ L 390, 12/31/2004, p. 38). 
Caution is advised as the Commission Directive 80/723/EC of 25 June 1980 on the 
transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings (OJ L 195, 
7/29/1980, p. 35), the Council Directive 89/105/EEC of 21 December 1988 relation to the 
transparency of measures regulating the prices of medical products for human use and their inclusion 
in the scope of national health insurance systems (OJ L 040, 2/11/1989, p. 8) and the Commission 
Directive 2000/52/EC of 26 July 2000 amending Directive 80/723/EEC on the transparency of 
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main focus of this Directive is the provision of amplified and harmonized disclosure 
requirements for publicly traded companies. Therewith the information standards 
should be tightened and thus a genuine Single Market for financial services finally 
enabled. The necessity of highly qualitative and comparable financial statements was 
also pointed out by the European Council in Lisbon172 in March 2000 and by the 
European Council in Barcelona173 two years later174.
The Transparency Directive entered into force after two consultations175 on 
January 20, 2005176. It must be implemented by the Member States within two years. 
Until the transposition of the Directive into national law the Directive does not have 
any direct impact on the Member States, its issuers and investors. The impact is only 
indirect as in the future these upgraded disclosure rules will have to be observed by the 
issuers. Hence, they have to make themselves familiar with these rules soon and 
financial relations between Member States and public undertakings (OJ L 193, 7/29/2000, p. 75) are
also sometimes referred to as “Transparency Directive” for short.
171
 Action plan (supra note 44).
172
 See the presidency conclusion of the Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000 
(supra note 50).
173
 See the presidency conclusion of the Barcelona European Council 15 and 16 March 2002, 
available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/bulletins/pdf/01s2002_en.pdf (last visited May 6, 2005).
174 See also Recital 3 of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170). 
175
 The first consultation was launched by the Commission in July 2001 (see supra note 168)
and the press release IP/01/999, available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=IP/01/999&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited May 6, 
2005). Thereby the Commission made for the first time ever use of an open consultation process on 
the Internet upon the recommendation of the Lamfalussy Committee (see the final report of the 
Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, chaired by Alexandre 
Lamfalussy [supra note 53]). Therewith it was ensured, that contributions could be made by a huge 
amount of interested parties, covering a broad variety of interests. Consequently, this open 
consultation process lead to 90 responses from the entire European Community (see the Summary of 
the replies received to the Consultation Document of 11 July 2001 for details, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/
transparency/consultation1/trans_en.pdf, last visited May 6, 2005, as well as the press release 
IP/01/1861 [see supra note 169]).
Nearly one year later, in May 2002, the second and final consultation, focusing on several 
aspects rather than on general statements, was launched (see the Second Consultation Document by 
the Services of the Internal Market Directorate General of the European Commission, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/transparency/consultation2/2ndconsult-
cover_en.pdf, with a detailed outline in Annex 1, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internal_market/securities/docs/transparency/consultation2/2ndconsult-details_en.pdf (both last 
visited May 6, 2005). Again the European Commission received various inputs, which all together 
resulted in the proposal for the Transparency Directive, COM(2003) 138 final (supra note 42). 
The proposal was then approved by the European Parliament in March 2004 (see press 
release IP/04/0398, available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
IP/04/398&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, last visited May 6, 2005). In 
May 2004 a “fast-track” agreement was reached between the Council and the European Parliament. 
Therefore, without a second reading the Transparency Directive could have been signed in December 
2004 (see press release IP/04/1508, available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=IP/04/1508&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, last visited May 6, 
2005).
176 According to Article 34 of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170) the Directive shall 
enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the 
European Union. The Directive was published in this Journal on December 31, 2004.
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instruct their accounting departments and employees accordingly. In some cases, an 
adoption of the operational procedure might be necessary.
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1. Spirit and Purpose of the Directive
The main focus of the Transparency Directive is the improvement of securities
markets through increased transparency. This goal is sought to be achieved by 
increasing the information flow between issuers and investors177. Investors should be 
kept informed periodically, even in regard to major shareholdings of companies to 
facilitate a reasonable evaluation of the issuer’s situation178, including the voting 
structure179. Hence, the Transparency Directive provides a minimum standard of 
disclosure requirements. With the directive investors should be provided sufficient and 
appropriate information in order to protect them highly180. The better investors are 
protected the more they trust the issuers of the securities and the better their capital 
will be allocated by reducing capital costs181. This again has a positive impact on the 
effectiveness of the market, economic growth, and job creation182. However, in order 
to achieve these positive effects it has to be assured that all investors are in possession 
of all the required information within a reasonable time183. Therefore, any kind of 
media, which can be reasonably relied on being capable of reaching the entire 
Community, has to be used for notification 184. Only thereby can financial reports be 
compared and the best possible protection provided185.
2. Scope of application
The Transparency Directive appeals to “issuers whose securities are already 
admitted to trading on a regulated market situated or operating a Member State.”186
The term securities is determined in Article 2 of the Transparency Directive187
and shall include all classes of securities which are negotiable on the capital market
such as “(a) shares in companies and other securities equivalent to shares in 
companies, partnerships or other entities, and depositary receipts in respect of shares; 
(b) bonds or other forms of securitized debt, including depositary receipts in respect of 
such securities; (c) any other securities giving the right to acquire or sell any such 
transferable securities or giving rise to a cash settlement determined by reference to 
transferable securities, currencies, interest rates or yields, commodities or other indices 
177
 See Recital 2 of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
178
 See Recital 11 of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
179
 See Recital 18 of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
180
 See the proposal for the Transparency Directive (supra note 42), at 1.2. See also Recital 5 
and 41 of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
181
 See Recital 1 of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170) and the proposal for the 
Transparency Directive (supra note 42), at 1.1.
182
 See Recital 1 of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170) and the press release from 
March 2004 (see supra note 175).
183 See Recital 10 of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170). 
184
 Article 21of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
185 See Recital 10 of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170). 
186 Article 1 Z 1 of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
187
 In conjunction with Article 4 (1) point 18 of Directive 2004/39/EC (see supra note 86).
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or measures”, excluding money-market instruments188, with a maturity of less than 12 
months and national legislation applicable.
According to that very broad definition the European Union opted for a “one 
size fits all approach”189 to create a common level playing field for equity and debt 
issuers. As issuers of equity and debt securities are put under a uniform disclosure 
regime, their equal treatment not only leads to more consistency but also ensures that 
“certain issuers, such as start ups and high tech companies, mainly traded outside the 
official listing segment”, are now on file too190.
For issuers who are not yet admitted to trading on a regulated market or 
operating, investors are protected by the Prospectus Directive. They have to meet the 
requirements set up in the Prospectus Directive in order to be admitted. After the 
admission of their securities to trading on a regulated market they are subject to the 
Transparency Directive.
3. Periodic information
In its Chapter II the Transparency Directive specifies several periodic disclosure 
requirements that have to be fulfilled in the first instance by the issuer as the main 
addressee in order to provide investors with the proper and current information they 
need for the issuers’ rating. Exemptions to these obligations are only available very 
rarely191.
a. Annual financial reports. The first periodic report mentioned in the 
Transparency Directive is the “annual financial report”192. It has to be disclosed within 
four month after the end of the financial year193. Moreover the report should be made
188
 Defined in Article 4 (1) point 19 of Directive 2004/39/EC (see supra note 86) : “[C]lasses 
of instruments which are normally dealt in on the money market, such as treasury bills, certificates of 
deposit and commercial papers and excluding instruments of payments.” 
189
 Rather then using a “risk based approach”. See the Summary of the replies to the First 
Consultation Document (supra note 175), at 2.2.
190
 See the First Consultation Document (supra note 168), at 4.2.
191
 See Article 8 of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170). Accordingly only States, its 
local authorities, certain public international bodies, national central banks and the ECB are excluded 
form the obligation to provide all this contemporary information. The same applies to certain issuers 
with a denomination per unit of at least EUR 50.000. In Article 8 Z 2 and 3 the Transparency 
Directive grants the possibility for home Member States to set aside further exemptions for the 
provision of half-yearly financial reports for credit institutions (under certain circumstances) and 
issuers of debt securities, who have already existed prior to December 31, 2003.
192 See Article 4 of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170). However, this annual 
financial report is not equated with the final version which has to be approved by the shareholders in 
the annual meeting, although it has to be audited too (see the proposal for the Transparency Directive 
[supra note 42]), at 4.2.1. It provides less detailed information.
193 Article 4 (1) of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170). Until then the deadline for 
the publication of the annual financial report has not been harmonized. As a result it varied among 
the Community’s Member States as the Directive 2001/34/EC (supra note 77) only stated in its 
Article 67 (1) that the publication has to take place “as soon as possible”, without further defining 
that deadline
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publicly available for five years194. This assures that information can also be tracked 
back. Therewith it should be ensured that the investors receive all the information they 
need to make appropriate appraisals about the financial situation of the issuer and its 
offered securities, which also requires taking the company’s past activities and their 
future development into account.
The elements of the annual financial report are listed in Article 4 Z 2 of the 
Transparency Directive: It consists of 3 sections: (i) the audited financial statements,
(ii) the management report and (iii) a statement by the responsible person.
Accordingly the annual financial report should include a financial statement. It 
has to be audited in accordance with the Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC195 and 
the Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EC196; the latter just in the case the issuer is 
subject to the Seventh Council Directive and therefore has to provide annual 
consolidated accounts197. Therefore, the authorized auditor, whose name has to be 
publicly disclosed too198, has to confirm, that the financial statement is conforming to
the annual or consolidated accounts for the same financial year199.
The annual financial report must also include a management report. This report 
– again – has to be prepared in accordance with the Fourth and Seventh Council 
Directive. Therefore, the management report should give fairly detailed information 
about the company’s past development and its future prospects200. Moreover the 
management report should inter alia provide data on the company’s research and 
development activities201.
In the end, the person responsible has to affirm that the financial statements 
have been prepared in all good conscience and according to the accounting rules, 
194 Article 4 (1) of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170). In addition Article 4 
provides in its last sentence the competence to the Commission to adjust the period of five years 
when reasonable. However, the time limit of 5 years makes up a standardizing/shorting comparable 
to the present state of affairs as the Directive 2001/34/EC (supra note 77) did not provide any time 
period.
195 Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the 
Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies (OJ L 222, 08/14/1978, p. 11). Directive 
last amended by Directive 2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 
2003 amending Directives 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC on the annual 
and consolidated accounts of certain types of companies, banks and other financial institutions and 
insurance and undertakings (OJ L 178, 7/17/2003, p. 16).
196 Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EC of 13 June 1983 based on the Article 54 (3) (g) of 
the Treaty on consolidated accounts (OJ L 193, 07/18/1983, p. 1). Directive last amended by 
Directive 2003/51/EC (supra note 195).
197 Article 4 (4) of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
198 Article 4 (4) of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
199
 Article 51 of the Fourth Council Directive (supra note 195) and Article 37 of the Seventh 
Council Directive (supra note 196).
200 Article 46 of the Fourth Council Directive (supra note 195) and Article 36 of the Seventh 
Council Directive (supra note 196). Such a trend information on the company’s future evolution 
should help investors “not only to judge on the basis of achieved results, but also to take due account 
of any long-term strategy, which an issuer currently pursues.” (see the proposal for the Transparency 
Directive [supra note 42], at 4.3.2).
201 Article 46 of the Fourth Council Directive (supra note 195) and Article 36 of the Seventh 
Council Directive (supra note 196).
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giving a true and fair view of the issuer’s present situation and future development, 
including the existing risks and uncertainties202.
b. Half-yearly financial reports. Besides preparing an annual financial report the 
issuer is also required – according to Article 5 – to draw up a half-yearly financial 
report. It has to be published as soon as possible, but in any case no later than within 2 
months after the mid-year ending203. It too has to be kept public for five years too204.
Again, the reports consist of three parts, very similar to the ones required for the 
annual financial report: (i) the condensed set of financial statements, (ii) an interim 
management report and (iii) a statement by a responsible person.
The summary of the financial statements’ set should draw up the financial 
situation of the issuer by providing a balance sheet and a profit and loss account 
including some notes205.
The interim management report should provide information on relevant events 
having taken place in the first half of the financial year, including their impact on the 
financial statements206. Furthermore, future risks and uncertainties relevant for the 
second half of the financial year should also be reported as well as – if shares are 
issued – major related parties’ transactions207.
Again, the statement by a responsible person should affirm that the documents 
have been set up with best knowledge, according to the rules, providing a true and fair 
view, especially with regard to the interim management report208.
c. Interim management standards. Besides these two statements, the 
Transparency Directive sets up a third mandatory statement, which can only be waived 
by providing quarterly financial reports in accordance with the respective national 
laws209. If this is not the case, the management has – according to Article 6 Z 1 – to 
draw up an interim management statement twice a year if the issuer’s shares are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market. The statement has to focus on the period, 
starting 10 weeks after the beginning and closing 6 weeks before the ending of each of 
the 6 month periods210. All relevant events and transaction during this period,
202 Article 4 (2) (c) of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
203
 The previous Directive on regular reporting (Council Directive 82/121/EEC, see supra
note 169) was repealed by the Directive 2001/34 [supra note 77]. The latter set aside the deadline 
with four months in its Article 72 (1). This seemed to be too long according to international best 
practices (see First Consultation Document [supra note 168], at 4.3.4.
204
 This makes up a standardizing/shorting comparable to the present state of affairs. 
205
 Article 5 (3) of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
206




 Article 5 (2) (c) of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
209
 See Article 6 (2) of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
210 Article 6 (1) of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
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including their influence on the issuer’s financial situation, have to be reported among 
with information on the issuer’s financial situation itself211.
This increased frequency of regular reporting is – according to the European 
Commission – essential in order to stay competitive212. Without a harmonization in this 
field some issuers within the European Community would face an enormous 
competitive disadvantage as some investment firms do not consider purchasing 
securities, whose issuers are not preparing quarterly financial reports, and some EU 
stock exchanges already require this kind of reporting frequency213. On the other hand, 
one also has to take into account that an advanced frequency of reporting statements is 
not only very costly and time-consuming (even for the investors to process the data) 
but might also lead to a focus on a short instead of a long term view of the company’s 
performance214.
d. Responsibility and liability. Concerning responsibility and liability issues the 
Directive does not include any detailed rules. It only clearly points out in its Article 7 
that it’s the Member States duty to provide legal rules, which assures that the issuer or 
it’s administrative, the management or the supervisory bodies are going to be held 
liable for their mandatory provided periodic information. Without these liability 
provisions the quality of the information provided cannot be guaranteed and hence 
investors’ confidence could not be restored.
4. Ongoing information
According to the Transparency Directive issuers are not obligated to just 
provide periodic and hence contemporary information. Rather, Chapter III of the 
Transparency Directive includes provisions stating which information is material and 
as such have an enormous impact on the investors’ estimation of the issuers’ securities
and its value. That asymmetry has to be cut back by disclosing too, even beyond the 
periodic statements, on an ad-hoc basis215.
a. Information about major holdings. One issue the European Union was 
especially concerned about is related to major holdings. Major holdings have an impact 
on voting structures. The existence of major holdings might lead to a blockage of the 
minorities, which reduces the value of minority shares. Besides, even a change in the 
identity of the controlling shareholder might have an effect (positive or negative) on 
the shares’ value. Hence, investors should be provided information related to any such 








 See also the concerns expressed in the Summary of the replies to the First Consultation 
Document (supra note 175), at 2.3.
215
 See the Press Release, IP/01/999 (supra note 175).
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trading216 days217. Waiting for the next periodic report might not be sufficient, 
especially with regard to the detail that the reports have to be published two or rather 
four months after the specific period ending. Information symmetry has to be restored 
as soon as possible. Thus, an immediate notification of material changes in the 
company’s ownership structure is required218.
Regarding this issue, Article 9 provides an obligation of the shareholder to 
notify the issuer whenever his voting rights change due to an acquisition or disposal of 
major holdings. With regard to any reaching, exceeding or falling the threshold values 
vary from 5% to 75 %.In addition, the information is also required to be published if 
major proportions of voting rights are acquired or disposed of in accordance with 
Article 10. Therewith it should be ensured that even changes of the voting structures 
by e.g. contracting on a voting agreement, temporary transfers of voting rights, or 
similar cases are recorded since the effect is the same219. Furthermore, a notification is 
required in the case of the issuer acquiring or disposing its own shares as soon as the 
threshold value of 5 % or 10 % is reached, exceeded or has fallen below220. Again, the 
information has to be provided within four trading days221. In addition, the public has 
to be notified, without delay, of any changes in the rights that various classes of shares 
are entitled222. The same applies to any modification of security holders’ rights or any 
new loan issues223.
b. Information for holders of securities admitted to trading on a regulated 
market. Another issue the European Union focused on was the information that has to 
be provided to share and debt holders, especially regarding to their voting rights224.
It clarifies that all share and debt holders have to be treated equally225. Hence, 
no information asymmetry should exist on the horizontal level by providing more 
information to some share or debt holders than to others. This especially refers to 
information that is required to exercise the rights by proxy. Only thereby it can be 
guaranteed that voting rights are exercised uniformly. Therefore is has to be ensured 
that all the information related to the meeting such as time, place and agenda, is known 
by the share and debt holders226. Moreover, the proxy form has to be made available, 
216 In order to ensure a uniform application of the Directive, the Commission will determine 
the trading days for the European Community (Article 12 (8) of the Transparency Directive [supra
note 170]).
217 Article 12 (2) of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170). 
218
 See also Recital 18 of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170). 
219Article 10 of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170) is based on Article 92 of the 
Directive 2001/34/EC (supra note 77).
220 Article 14 of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
221
 ld.
222 Article 16 (1) of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
223
 See Article 16 (2) and (3) of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
224
 The text is based on Article 65 and 78 of the Directive 2001/34/EC (supra note 77).
225 Article 17 (1) and 18 (1) of the Directive. 
226
 Article 17 (2) (a) and 18 (2) (a) of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
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either in hard copy or electronically to each elective share and debt holder227 as well as 
all the necessary information concerning the payment of dividends and the issue of 
new shares228. As a result it should be ensured that every elective share and debt holder 
can make use of their primary rights by participating in meetings. 
5. General obligations
a. Control by the home Member State. Aside from the issuer’s duty to keep the 
public informed concerning the information in the Transparency Directive required, he 
also has – at the same time – the duty to notify the competent authority229 of its home 
Member State230. This additional filing has more the purpose of overseeing whether the 
disclosure requirements are respected than controlling231. It has more the effect of 
making sure that the required information is provided in time, which could not be 
verified that easily if the information would only be provided for the public. They are 
in charge of making the decision of whether to put the information on their Internet site 
as well. The same applies if an issuer intends to amend its instrument of incorporation 
or status. Such a proposal has to be handed over to the competent authority as well as 
to the regulated market232. Moreover any information related to an acquisition or 
disposal of major holdings or major proportions of voting rights has to be deposited at 
the competent authority of the home Member State as well233.
b. Language provision. At present, each Member State can insist on disclosing 
the information in its official language(s)234. Hence, the Transparency Directive 
distinguishes in Article 20 concerning the language issue with the purpose of being 
more frank with the world of international finance235. Concerning the language the 
information has to be disclosed the Transparency Directive distinguishes in Article 
20236: If the information is related to securities, which are only traded in the home 
Member State, the language accepted by its competent authority has to be used. If a 
host Member State is also involved the information has to be additionally provided 
either in the language accepted by the competent authority of the host Member State or 
227
 See Article 17 (2) (b) and 18 (2) (b) of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170). 
228
 Article 17 (2) (d) of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170). 
229
 One single competent authority has to be designated by each of the Member States 
(Article 24 of the Transparency Directive [supra note 170]), as it has already been recommended by 
the Committee of the Wise Men (see the final report of the Committee of Wise Men on the 
Regulation of European Securities Markets, chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy [supra note 53]). 
Therewith a simple and efficient management can be ensured (see the First Consultation Document 
[supra note 168], at 4.6.1.
230 Article 19 (1) of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
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232
 See Article 19 (1) of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
233 Article 19 (3) of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
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 Therewith the present regime in Article 103 of Directive 2001/34/EC (supra note 77) 
should me modernized in order to enable cross-border investments more easily (see also the proposal 
for the Transparency Directive (supra note 42), at 4.3.2.
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in the language being used in the field of international finance. The choice is up to the 
issuer. In case, the securities are only admitted to trading in the host Member State, but 
not in the home Member State the language provision concerning the home Member 
State no longer applies. With this various language provisio ns it should be ensured that 
everyone, for whom the information is important and intended for also receives it, in a 
less costly and less burdensome way; this also with the intention of attracting more 
investors from third countries237. Otherwise the whole disclosure requirements would 
be senseless if the target group is not capable of turning the information to account.
Besides, 
c. Third countries. In case the issuer’s registered office is situated in a third 
country, the competent authority of the home Member State has the power to waive 
certain disclosure requirements if the third country provides equal ones238. This might 
likely be the case where the United States is the third country, as stricter disclosure 
rules apply there239. Thereby the high disclosure standards are not put at risk and costs 
for providing the information can be reduced. Hence, the Directive removes senseless 
burdens by providing an equivalent standard.
d. Penalties. The Member States have to ensure, by setting up penalty provision 
in accordance with their national law that the responsible persons comply with the 
disclosure requirements provided in the Transparency Directive240. As the 
Transparency Directive entered into force in January 2005 no proposal set up by the 
Member States to meet their obligations are yet available.
6. Further European enforcing provisions
The Transparency Directive represents a “framework Directive” according to
the agreement with the European Parliament on improving the regulation of EU 
securities markets from February 2002241. Therefore the Transparency Directive itself 
only sets up general conditions, without dealing with technical details. The further 
details have to be provided according to the Lamfalussy procedure by the Commission 
assisted by the European Securities Committee (ESC)242. This four-level approach has 
to be finished within the two-year period as well. Such further rules are e.g. requested 
for obligations relating to keeping publicly disclosed information available, for the 
filing of the information in the home Member State, for the dissemination of 
information and for several definitions such as one for disclosure by electronic 
237
 See the proposal for the Transparency Directive (supra note 42), at 3.2.
238 Article 23 (1) of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
239 See the detailed outline of the Second Consultation Document (supra note 175), at 6.
240
 See Article 28 of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
241 See the press release IP/03/436, at p. 3, available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/press
ReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/436&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
(last visited May 6, 2005). 
242
 This Committee has been established by the Commission Decision 2001/528/EC of 6 June 
2001 (OJ L 191, 07/13/2001, p.45) and only acts consultatively.
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means
243
. As the Transparency Directive entered into force in January 2005, no 
documents related to the Level 2 to 4 are published yet.
243
 See Article 5 (6) (a), 19 (4), 21 (4) and 2 (3) (c) of the Transparency Directive (supra note 
170). See also MEMO/03/68, at p. 9, available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
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III. THE EUROPEAN UNION: QUO VADIS?
During the last five years a lot of has changed in the field of European law on 
capital markets. Several working groups composed of legal experts have examined the 
present situation of the European capital markets, which has lead to proposals for 
modifications244. The result of most of these proposals has been many provisions; each 
had to be implemented by the Member States, partly the implementation process is still 
ongoing245. This development does not appear to be a slow process; rather the 
development is happening in a quick succession with working groups being set up and 
directives being enacted one after another246. No end to these developments is in sight. 
In fact, the European Union, just having finished putting 43 measures into directives 
and provisions in the past 5 years, that were outset in the action plan, is already 
planning on setting up new working groups and enacting even more provisions247.
This high level of activity raises the question as to the direction that the 
European Union and its Member States are actually heading. One thing is already 
clear: Further provisions within the field of capital markets are on their way. Yet this 
only raises the further question: Where are they heading? One main reason for the 
European Union’s activity was to promote the European capital market as a response 
to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act248, which was the United States Congress’ answer to the 
aforementioned scandals. Due to the need to restore investors’ lost confidence, 
Congress mainly focused on the auditing and the information process, and thereby 
signaling that the law would protect investors from further scandals. Consequently, the 
European Union had to signal that investors are also protected in the European Union. 
Otherwise the European Union would have run the risk of losing all its investors to the 
US market, where investor protection was a main concern. Due to this shared goal of 
regaining investors’ confidence and ensuring strong protection for investors there is 
reason to believe that the European Union and the United States are heading towards a 
convergence in their laws on the capital markets.
There are two main reasons for this: First, scandals that occur in one country 
also have effects in and on other countries. Take the scandals in the United States for 
example. These scandals not only had a tremendous impact on the US capital market, 
but also rocked the capital markets in the European Union. US investors were forced to 
direct confront the risk involved with capital markets, learned from their own 
(negative) experience what it felt like lose a great deal of invested money on a daily 
basis. At the same time, investors in the European market were able to learn indirectly 
244 See II.
245 See e.g. the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
246
 For critique on this trend see IV.
247 Especially with regard to the Prospectus and the Transparency Directive a lot of 
provisions still have to be implemented according to the Lamfalussy process. Concerning the 
Prospectus Directive just one measure has been adopted yet, with regard to the Transparency 
Directive none.
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from the scandals happening in the United States as they were eventually exposed for 
the entire world to see. Moreover, scandals happening in the European Union opened
the eyes of investors to truth and reality and thereby also made a contribution to the 
confidence crises: Although the investors are the “money givers” it is often difficult for 
them to actually find out and monitor what’s happening with their money. As long as 
times are good and investors get their expected return on their money, only a minority 
if anyone, cares about what is really going on behind the scenes. As soon as times are 
bad however such as the circumstances there existed when the scandals occurred 
investors want more insight into the entire process because they are no longer 
confident in blindly investing into a company. 
Second, the law on capital markets may lead to a uniform law on capital 
markets due to the fact the mobility of capital. Capital can be invested almost 
anywhere in the world in no time. Not only are investors aware of this; lawmakers and 
companies know this as well. Due to the mobility of capital, it is up to the investors to 
decide where and when to invest. Ostensibly they will base their decisions primarily on 
the basis of which company has the most promising future. That is, they will invest in 
the company that is expected to bring the highest return. However, one important 
consideration that arises while making the investment decision is the degree of 
protection a capital market provides for its investors. In regard to this issue, the United 
States and the European Union are in competition. Which ever market does the better 
job of protecting its investors is likely to attract more investors and thus more
money249. Therefore both, the United States and the European Union, will not only 
work on providing “new” rules in order to protect investors, but will also examine each 
other’s efforts at copying certain rules that either they think are reasonable in achieving 
the goal on providing a sufficient protection or that investors think are necessary to 
protect them. Due to this competitive copying process both sets of laws on capital 
markets, the US version and the European version, will eventually turn out to be very 
similar, at least in the long run.
Therefore, the race for investors, between the United States and the European 
Union will be quite active. Since the capital market is simply too important to lose 
neither of them is likely to give up, the eventual outcome of the race will be two 
similar regimes.
IV. A CRITIQUE ON THE PRESENT TREND(S)
Data indicates that the law on capital market is moving toward greater 
regulation on a European level as well as toward a convergence of the law on capital 
markets250. This leads to two questions concerning this issue: (i) Does the European 
Union really need to become actively involved in the law on capital markets or would 
it be better off in letting the Member States regulate this field of law on an individual 
249
 That European companies are already seeking for investments made by the US can be 
seen from the US listings of Daimler Chrysler, SAP and Deutsche Bank.
250
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basis?; and (ii) Are the tremendous amounts of consultations and provisions really 
necessary or would a well functioning capital market be achieved equally well with 
less activity?
A. Is EU-wide activity necessary? The two sides of the argument:
1. National activity is preferable
Due to the cross-border activity engaged in by most companies and the resulting
globalization of the economy, work directed at improving capital markets is only 
meaningful if it is done on an EU-wide level. Otherwise any cross-border activities
would face needless burdens due to the various provisions of national law they would 
confront. Further evidence of a preferred EU-wide activity rather than a national one is 
provided by the fact that 25 Member States251 have decided to join the European Union 
and thereby form an EC-Single Market. To work on the capital market issue separately 
and in isolation would be detrimental to achieving that goal.
2. Working on an EU-wide harmonization is preferable
a. Fewer burdens. One reason the European Union was founded in the first 
place was because trading across the borders involves burdens that are harmful to 
competition. Hence the European Union has always been working on providing an EC-
Single Market. This formation constitutes one reason why the aim of improved capital 
markets can be better achieved by European-wide activity rather than the provisions of 
national rules from each Member State. The processes by which investors put their 
money into companies they think are going to be successful and worth the risk of 
investment should be facilitated. The further investment decision should be free from 
any burdens arising from cross-border investing and should instead be based primarily 
on facts about the company and predictions on its future of prospects. Consequently, 
the European Union addressed the issue of insider dealing and market manipulation on 
an EU-wide basis as any “[d]ifferent sets of responsibilities and powers of national 
administrative authorities hinder the establishment of a fully integrated market and add 
to market confusion.”252 EU-wide harmonization eliminates such confusion and this 
improves the capital market. Due to the presence of one European standard, 
prospectuses do no longer have to be prepared in the official language of each Member 
State in which the company trades and operates. In fact, one prospectus suffices for all 
operations occurring within the European Union to protect shareholders on a 
Community level253. The same applies is true for the disclosure requirements that were 
set up in the Transparency Directive. Eliminating these burdens assures a more 
251 Since May 1, 2004 the European Union counts 25 Member States.
252 See e.g. the proposal for a Directive on Market Abuse, COM (2001) 281 FINAL (supra
note 90), p. 4, pointing out that the issue of market abuse should be solved within a European 
common standard. As regard content see also the Press Release, MEMO 01/203, May 30, 2001, 
available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/01/203&format
=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited May 6, 2005).
253
 See Recital 20 of the Prospectus Directive (supra note 129). 
European Law on Capital Markets – quo vadis?48
efficient and effective allocation of capital among the Member States. In turn, 
competition will going be boosted, which will lead to an economy with increased 
prospects of greater success in the long run.
b. Fewer costs. A reduction of burdens also leads to a reduction of costs. First, 
only one solution needs to be found instead of twenty-five. Hence, the decision process 
only has to focus on the European Union as a whole, in order to ensure the provision of 
a level playing field for all market participants. Otherwise, each Member State would 
have to develop their own solution, while simultaneously having to take the solution of 
the other Member States (Member States that are neighbors in particular) into account 
in order to be equally competitive. Consequently, as soon as one Member State would 
find a better solution, the other Member States would be forced to respond to the 
changed legal circumstances. This whole legislative and adjustment process involves a 
lot of costs, a majority of them having to be borne by Member States individually. 
Second, costs are saved by providing a “one-size fits all approach” for the entire 
European Union. That is, preparing one prospectus in accordance with the legal 
requirements set forth by the Prospectus Directive is practically equivalent to twenty-
five prospectuses, one for each of the twenty-five Member States, without having to 
bear the costs for all twenty-five. Moreover, costs are – in principal –saved by dealing
with only one legal system, which is applicable to the entire European Union. 
Therefore, companies have to invest less money into international legal research and 
can instead either invest that $ into positive net present value projects intended to 
increase the shareholders’ return on their capital or pay it to the shareholders as 
dividends.
This cost advantage is no longer as big as it once was. It has been reduced due 
to the Lamfalussy procedure254 being mainly used by the European Union for their 
recently enacted Directives255. On the one hand, costs are being saved as directives can 
now be enacted more quickly due to the Lamfalussy process, whereby gaining the 
opportunity of responding quicker in case of changing capital markets by the European 
Union. But on the other hand, costs are also being generated due to the 4-Level 
approach the Lamfalussy procedure entails. Therefore, although costs are being saved 
on the first level, this advantage is reduced on the other 3 levels as many groups are 
working on giving further details to this issue, which was been left out of the directive 
due to its focus on merely providing a framework. This had lead not only to 
discrepancies in the rules and regulations, but also to less harmonization in these rules 
and regulations by giving the Member States partly back their authority of regulating 
certain (even though) smaller issues.
c. Globalization. A “one-size fits all approach” is in-line with the movement of 
the economy towards globalization. Accordingly, a common framework is needed to 
live up to the demands of the economy and its participants. This need is partly being 
addressed by having the European Union work on several issues more globally. 
254
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Moreover, the law on capital markets also being influenced by global events, which 
may someday lead to a globalization of the capital markets law someday. In such a 
case, common worldwide standards would be necessary, not merely common standards 
within the European Union and the United States.
B. Which degree of activity is preferable?
The several accounting scandals that have occurred worldwide have resulted 
especially in investors becoming especially suspicious of the information provided to 
them by a company. Hence, the capital market is presently faced with a crisis of 
confidence. The European Union has been being busy trying to improve the European 
capital market by attempting to  provide more and improved legal provisions, which the 
United States has done as well. The European Union has set up several working 
groups, several public consultations have taken place, and several directives and 
provisions have been enacted within the last few years256. Disclosure requirements are 
at a high level257. Regarding this activity by the European Union the question arises as 
to whether the appropriate degree of activity should be higher or lower.
1. High degree of activity
Several arguments can be made in supporting of the European Union’s high 
level of activity directed at improving the capital market.
a. More provisions – more information. Due to the aforementioned scandals the 
European Union is trying to fill any gaps that may have permitted such accounting 
misconducts to have occurred at all. Therefore the directives in the fields of law on 
capital markets, in particular the Directive on Market Abuse, the Prospectus Directive 
and the Transparency Directive, primarily deal with providing greater and extremely
detailed information to investors. Due to these efforts the information asymmetry 
between the market participants, the investors, on the one side, and the issuer on the 
other side, should be reduced to the mutual advantage of all parties. The information 
possessed by the issuer should be relatively equivalent with the information possessed 
by the investors, especially in regard to the company’s financial situation. 
Consequently, investors would lack less of information. (Negative) surprises are being 
reduced and investors’ confidence increased. Due to the creation of this transparency 
investors can better base their appraisal of the company’s value on facts and figures.
The more information investors have the better valuations they can make and the better 
money will be allocated among competitive companies.
b. More provisions – more reliable information. An appraisal of a company’s 
value will only be more accurate if the information is also reliable. Therefore it must
256
 See II.
257 See Press Release, MEMO/01/204 (supra note 132) at least regarding the issue of 
prospectuses.
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be assured that the figures and numbers provided by the issuers are not merely
meaningless inventions. It has to be ensured by law that the investors’ decision may be 
based on real facts. This aim was mainly tried to be achieved by making use of 
independent auditors. As evidenced by the Enron scandal, a lack of independence leads
to a lack of usefulness of the provided information. Therefore Congress mainly 
focused on this audition process in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The European Union had 
to deal less with this problem, as the issue of independent auditors has already been 
partly addressed earlier, mainly by the Eight Directive258. Besides, the Member States 
deal with this issue on a national law level259. Nevertheless, the directives also focus 
on the issue of providing more reliable information; therefore include articles setting 
forth the duties of the issuer providing statements, which have to be partly audited by 
an independent auditor260. Hence the auditors’ tasks have been increased in the 
interests of giving the information a better appearance of reliability.
Another possibility of making the information more reliable is through the 
provision of statements created by responsible persons certifying that the disclosed 
information is accurate and defined to the best of their knowledge261. Mostly, these 
provisions are connected with a liability and responsibility provision, which should 
ensure that the responsible person only certifies what is “true” and “within their best 
knowledge”. A heavy burden thus falls on these “responsible persons”, as they are 
likely the ones with the best knowledge as to what is really going on “behind the 
scenes” they are in the best position to give such a certification. At the same time, 
however, they are also in a position to cheat and gain private benefits out of the 
company. This risk could be reduced by placing a “responsibility and liability”
provision on these persons, which would discourage them from deceit. However, such 
a provision is rarely ever set up on an EU-wide basis. Instead, it is up to Member 
States to work on the responsibility and liability issue in a way that is consistent with 
their national law, leaving it therefore for example up to the Member States whether to 
address this issue within the private law or the criminal law262.
By making an intensified use of independent auditors and strict liability and 
responsibility provisions it may be assured that the increased amount of information 
provided is also reliable and therefore valuable to investors in their decision making 
process.
c. More provisions – less cheating. Apart from the fact that more reliable 
information leads to investment decisions being made on sounder bases, the provision 
of more legal rules also has the advantage of reducing gaps within the law. Most of the 
accounting scandals have happened due to people taking advantage of legal gaps, 
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 Eighth Council Directive 84/253/ECC of April 10, 1984, based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the 
Treaty on the approval of persons responsible for carrying out the statutory audits of accounting 
documents, OJ L 126, 04/10/1984, p. 20.
259 See Jürgen Schatzmann, Die Auswirkungen der Achten gesellschaftsrechtlichen Richtlinie 
auf die Bestellung zum Abschlussprüfer, RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 1984, p. 619.
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putting investors’ money into the managers’ pockets. Consequently, more detailed 
provisions may lead to a decreased opportunity for managers being able to cheat on 
investors, which will thereby decrease investors’ fears about being cheated. In 
addition, investors may become not only more optimistic but also less risk averse, 
which could have a positive impact on the development of capital markets as a whole.
2. Low degree of activity
Despite the aforementioned arguments favoring a high degree of legislative 
activity in the field of capital markets, there are also arguments favoring a lower 
degree of legislative activity.
a. Providing less “bad news”. Capital markets run on faith and trust, which 
confidence have been lost due to scandals. It is therefore good policy to try to regain 
this lost investors’ confidence. Since confidence is a main prerequisite for a working 
capital market, this issue has to be addressed at highest priority. However, it is unlikely 
that this can be achieved by simply providing any kind of bad news, which what is 
happening currently.
A prime example of the current focus on bad news is the Transparency 
Directive and its Chapter III on “Ongoing Information”263. There, any kind of material 
information as defined by the Directive must be made public within four trading days. 
Regarding this material information it is noticeable that the main emphasis is on 
changing voting structures and voting rights. Knowledge about voting-related process 
procedures, especially any changes made, is very important for investors, as a 
shareholders’ change of control is likely to have an impact on the shares’ value and 
hence the issuer’s offer to the investor. Concentrated ownership in a company always 
contains a danger of the majority shareholders gaining private benefits from the 
company at the expense of the minority shareholders. Therefore investors should be 
informed of any changes related to the voting structure so to allow them to make an 
adequate appraisal of the issuer’s offer. This is particularly important in countries 
where the ownership structure is concentrated than rather dispersed, such as is the case 
in the European Union, thus accounting for the focus on the issue of voting structures. 
The disclosure requirement applies in equal measure whether the voting structure is 
changing towards a concentrated or dispersed ownership arrangement, but the risk of 
being cheated is less for investors in the latter case. However, it is noted that the main 
reason for setting up this rule was to protect investors from the change of the voting 
structure towards a concentrated ownership structure264.
Since this type of change in the voting structure can have a negative effect on
the investor, it is appropriate to advise them on these changes by providing publicly
available information. However, the main criticism is on an overemphasis on “bad 
news”, as it gives investors and the corporate world the impression that the only news 
around is bad news. The situation is similar to that of judges. During their days on the 
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 See II.E.
264 See e.g. Recital 18 of the Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
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bench they are likely to get the impression people are just fighting, trying to get 
divorced, or trying to harm each other, even though this is not true. As a judge, as soon 
as you leave the Court you see that many people are doing many non-adversarial 
things. Investors often have troubles in being able to believe in the existence of “good 
companies” because the only things they get to see are financial statements and 
disclosure documents, pointing out all kind of risks associated with investing in the 
company. On top of that, the media also (primarily) provides information about 
accounting misconducts and other misdeed.
Therefore, this sort of “bad news” should only be made public if the probability 
of harm is sufficiently high. That is, “bad news” should only be brought to the public’s
attention if the chances of investors getting harmed are in all likelihood265. All
investors are, or should be, aware that investing in the capital market includes some 
level of risk. Otherwise the interest rate for these investments would not be higher than 
the rarely risk-free interest rate the bank pays a saving account. The difference in the 
interest rates is due to the characteristic risk of the capital market, of which investors 
are aware. Therefore there is no need of warning investors of every possible risk as too 
much warning only makes investors feel insecure and may lead them to believe that 
their being cheated is a foregone conclusion.
b. Too short a timeframe for such big modifications. The European Union has 
been actively engaged in improving the capital market during the last few years, 
perhaps even too active. In the pursuit of improvements, a lot of consultations have 
taken place. One result, of several, has been the action plan266, which lists 43 actions 
the European Union should take. Above all, the timeframe was set out as five years;
thus only five years for 43 actions and that is listed in just one of the consultation 
reports. This is a very short period of time, especially in regard to the legislative 
procedure being used in the European Union, where since May 1, 2004 all twenty-five
Member States267 have to find a proper solution to a problem268. On the basis of the 
action plan, the European Union attempted to reach the stated goal of taking all 43 
actions within 5 years. Surprisingly, they managed to achieve it, due in part to the use 
of the Lamfalussy process269. 
Due to this short time period the capital markets had no chance to respond. 
Therefore, the impact of the actions recently taken on the capital markets is not clear
yet. Whether a better protection has been improved or not will not be known until a 
few years at the earliest when the new scandals will either continue or cease to emerge. 
265 Although this might lead to the problem that it is hard to determine the likelihood of harm, 
especially if ex post harm has occurred. In such a case it would be very tough for the company to give 
evidence that ex ante the harm was not in all likelihood.
266 Action plan (supra note 44).
267 Before May 1, 2004, 15 Member States had to agree on the focused Directives.
268 Although the legislative procedure has been facilitated, at least on the first Level, due to 
the Lamfalussy process. See the final report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of 
European Securities Markets, chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy (supra note 53).
269 It is noted that they „only“ had to set up a main framework, leaving the details to Levels 2 
to 4 of the Lamfalussy process.
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Furthermore some of the directives have not yet been implemented into national law as 
the deadline for implementation has not yet passed. Some of the directives have only
recently been enacted270. It will take a few years before they are transposed into 
national law. As a result, we will have to wait a few years before learning about the 
impact these directives have on the capital market.
Moreover, further evidence that the European Union’s timeframe for making 
modifications is very short is that even directives have been enacted that deal more or 
less with the same issue. Take for example the Transparency Directive, which entered 
into force in January 2005, when its “predecessor” directive was only one year old. It 
is simply not possible for the Member States to implement all these directives into 
their national law within the required time limit, especially in addition to their own 
national legal issues. It would be better and more efficient to focus on quality rather on 
quantity and to first think about the problem and the solution in a very detailed way so 
as to enact a balanced and thoughtful directive rather than enacting directives and 
changing them within a year.
Given the preceding discussion, the European Union would be better off waiting 
until the impact of the recently enacted directives can be evaluated. It is likely that 
these directives already provide adequate protection to investors and that any further 
“legislation” activities would not be worth the costs implicated with their compliance.
The European Union should therefore “take a break” from establishing working groups 
and working on directives’ proposals. New directives should no longer be their first 
priority at the moment. In fact, the capital markets should be given some time to 
respond to the recent activity and then indicate by their response whether or nor more 
regulation is necessary.
c. Compromise at a cost of smoothness. During the last few years, the European 
Union has made extensive use of public consultations by post ing questions related to 
certain issues on the Internet. This has the advantage of allowing any interested groups 
and/or individuals to take part in the discussions. As a result, the European Union can 
benefit from the numerous inputs of individuals and organizations each possessing 
various interests and expectations271. However, compromises are inevitably the result 
of this sort of public consultation due to the large amount of varying interests and the 
wish on the part of the European Union of accommodating as much of those interests 
as possible. Although compromises have the advantage of giving each input and hence 
each interest group/individual weight, they also run the risk of satisfying none of the 
interest groups/individuals because none of their interests were completely met. 
Further, compromises also pose the danger of not providing a smooth, harmonious
system. This negative effect has been exacerbated due to the overly heavy activity of 
the European Union. The result now is that all of the actions taken and the directives 
270 E.g. Transparency Directive (supra note 170).
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enacted do not fit together that smoothly as they should. Both the stock and the capital 
markets should be a smooth functioning whole.
d. Confidence takes time. Investors have lost a lot of money due to the recent 
worldwide accounting scandals272 and so their confidence in the capital market and the
information it provides is deeply shaken and the “bad news” constantly broadcast in 
the media fresh in the minds. Confidence cannot be regained overnight. It can only be 
redeveloped in very slow small steps. This is another reason why a low degree of 
“legislative” is the more promising course of action. Moreover, confidence has to be 
earned. To judge whether the capital markets deserve their confidence or not, investors 
will need time. Therefore, investors have to be given the chance to observe the capital 
market and its development. Even with more consultations and directives lost 
investors’ confidence cannot be restored immediately. It takes time, and the European 
Union should give to investors and the markets their necessary “breathing room”.
e. Protection is not cost free. One must also be aware that providing investor 
protection is not cost free. Observing the law and its numerous disclosure requirements 
is very costly. For instance, several employees have to work on providing the 
information the company is obliged to disclose by the law. Moreover, auditors have to 
be hired to examine the information provided in several statements, verifying their 
content and accuracy. These costs are not going to be paid by the company; rather they 
are going to be borne by the shareholders. Since the costs are expenses of the 
company, they reduce profits and hence reduce the amount of money that could be
invested in future projects that could make further profits or could paid as dividends to 
the shareholders. So long as these costs are within manageable limits, shareholders will 
likely be willing to bear them in return for receiving more protection, especially as the 
recent scandals are still fresh in their minds. In a few years, however, when the 
scandals have blown over, shareholders might no longer be willing to bear all these 
costs. This unwillingness could start a further race between the United States and the 
European Union in the fields of capital markets law, in particular on the issue of 
providing sufficient shareholder protection at the lowest possible cost.
f. Scandal can never be completely eliminated. One has to be realistic. Even 
with the most detailed provisions and regulations, scandals can never be avoided 
entirely. There might be less of them because the legal gaps are increasingly being 
closed and more people will be monitoring companies and their managers. Moreover, 
the ongoing “legislative” will result in earlier detection of the scandals that do occur, 
resulting in a decrease in the harm done to investors. However, the amount of scandals
will never be reduced to zero, as not all the gaps can be filled by legal rules. The level
of investors’ confidence can be restored by more detailed provisions, but whenever
risk and uncertainty are involved, confidence can never be fully satisfied by legal 
provisions. If there are corrupt individuals out there with the intention of cheating the 
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investors and putting their money into their own pockets, they will still try and do so
and even the most detailed provisions will not stop all of them. While the possibilities 
for fraud are being reduced, there are still some, albeit limited, gray areas, which 
provide the potential for manipulating financial results. The possibilities for cheating 
have not disappeared entirely and this should be taken into account when determining
the degree of “legislative”: The benefits always have to outweigh the costs.
V. CONCLUSION
I come to the conclusion that although it is preferable attempting to achieve 
harmonization on an EU-wide basis rather than on a national basis and although a high 
level of legislative activity leads to more reliable information and less cheating 
opportunities, the European Union should pursue a lower degree of legislative activity. 
This is due to several reasons: First, capital markets run on faith and trust, both of 
which have been lost due to the accounting scandals. It is therefore good policy to try 
to regain this lost investors’ confidence. Since confidence is a main prerequisite for a 
working capital market, this issue must be considered a top priority. It is unlikely 
however that this can be achieved by simply providing any kind of “bad news”, which 
what is currently happening. Second, the European Union has been very actively 
engaged in improving the capital market during the last years. Due to the short period 
of time in which this activity has taken place there has been no chance for the capital 
market to react. Therefore, the impact of all the recent actions taken on the capital 
markets is not yet clear. Third, due to the extensive use of public consultations, which 
are intended to make sure that as many interests as possible are taken into 
consideration, the whole system does not fit together as smoothly as it should. 
Moreover, building confidence takes time; it cannot be regained overnight. In addition, 
since investor protection is not cost free, but comes at the expense of profits, 
shareholders might not be willing to pay for it, especially in a few years when the 
scandals have blown over. Consequently, I point out that scandals can never be 
completely eliminated even with the most detailed provisions and regulations. As long 
as “bad guys” are out there with the intention of cheating the investors and stealing 
their money, scandals can never be entirely avoided. This reality should also be taken 
into account when determining the proper degree of legislation so as to ensure that the 
benefits always outweigh the costs.
